Chapter 5. International Relations

Last updated 10-21-2010

Copyright 2008-10 Robert E. Botsch

 

 

Treaties are like young girls and roses. They last while they last.    Charles de Gaulle

 

OUTLINE

 

I. Defining the area of study

   A. International Relations

   B. International Studies

   C. International Politics

   E. International Organizations and International Law

   F. Foreign Policy

 

II. International Actors in the world community

    A. Individual Actors

    B. National Actors

    C. Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO's)

    D. Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO's)

    E. Terrorist Organizations and/or Patriotic Fronts

    F. Multinational Corporations (MNC's)

 

III. International politics versus internal state politics

    A. How different

    B. Why different

 

IV. The concept of power in International Relations

    A. Elements of power

       1. Human resources

          a. Numbers‑‑less important

          b. Qualitative characteristics‑‑more important

             1) education

             2) economic skills

             3) culture and ideology‑‑nationalism

             4) unity and morale

       2. Material resources

       3. Organizational capabilities

       4. Leadership skills

    B. Foreign aid‑‑military and/or economic

       1. As a tool for power

       2. Normative considerations‑‑Why give foreign aid?

    C. The distribution of power in the world‑‑changing realities

       1. Balance of power politics

       2. Tight Bi‑polar System

       3. Loose Bi‑polar System

       4. A "Uni-polar" World?

    D. Power rationally wasted‑‑the arms race   

    E. Lines of conflict

       1. First World

       2. Second World

       3. Third World

       4. Fourth World

    F. Revolutionary power

 

 

 

TEXT

 

I. Defining the area of study‑‑Areas of study associated with International Relations 


     International relations is an extremely broad area. Sometimes it gets lumped together with another area, comparative politics. That is the case at many small schools where one or two professors have to cover both areas. However, at larger schools international relations is an autonomous area that is sometimes even separate from the political science department. At many schools you can get a separate degree in something like International Studies or International Relations. Because of this distinction and because they are conceptually different, we will separate international relations and comparative politics. Nevertheless, you should understand that they are closely related. They are related in the sense that understanding the differences among cultures and political systems‑‑comparative politics‑‑helps in understanding the interrelationships among nations‑‑international relations.

 

     Regardless of how political scientists deal with these areas, most people are thoroughly confused in talking about international relations. People are so confused that they either disregard this area of life completely (what does it matter to me who is killing whom in Sudan or Lebanon or in Bosnia or in Somalia or in Haiti or in Rwanda or in Kosovo or in East Timor or in Afghanistan or in Iraq – what else is new), or they attempt to understand what happens elsewhere by applying American values and rules of domestic politics (why can't they just have an election in Haiti or Somalia or Gaza or Iraq or Afghanistan to decide who will run the country?).  At the same time in the post 9-11 world, most Americans realize that what happens in the rest of the world can affect us, whether we like it or not.

 

     What I want to do in the first part of this chapter is introduce you to some of the terminology that is sometimes used to describe international relations and its subareas. You will be learning some new terms and some new things about the world around you. I think you will find international relations both interesting and rewarding. Being able to deal with other nations that are growing more powerful and more independent may even be critical to the long term security of the United States. If you do find this interesting, then you may want to know more a take some additional courses in the international area. Because we are now living in a highly interdependent international economy, you may need to know things in the world outside the U.S. in order to make a good living!

 

   A. International Relations

 

     We might define this term as encompassing the ongoing relationships between international actors. It is extremely broad in scope including any kind of relation that may exist. International relations includes such diverse relations as trade and the Olympics to the nuclear arms limitation talks between the U.S. and the Russian Republics (what is left of the old USSR). Therefore, when we talk about international relations, we are including economic, social, and cultural as well as political relationships.

 

    B. International Studies 


     This term is often applied to multidisciplinary programs of study at universities that prepare a student for an active career in the international arena. USC Columbia has such a program that uses this title. In such a program, one would study language, politics, culture, history, geography, literature, business and a variety of other topics. This is the broadest term, covering not only the relations aspect, but also area studies (where you focus on one particular area of the world‑‑like U.S. politics or African politics, etc.) and comparative politics.

 

   C. International Politics

 

     This term is much more limited in scope and refers to only those relationships that are political in nature. Of course, if you define politics as broadly as we have in this course, we would still be including a very broad range of relationships.

 

 

   D. International Organizations and International Law

 

     A great deal of emphasis is placed on the study of international organizations and law by those in the field of international relations. Most average citizens pay little attention to these areas and usually scoff at the value of international laws and organizations. Nevertheless, both international organizations and law can and do play an important role in the world today. World‑wide problems such as pollution, nuclear proliferation, trade, famine, the use of common air and water space as well as the heavens, and the protection of migratory animals often require an internationally coordinated effort. 

 

     Certainly such groups as the United Nations often fail and certainly nations often ignore international laws (see the quote by de Gaulle at the beginning of this chapter). If you wish to take a moralistic approach here, all nations share in the blame. Americans were fond of saying that the Soviet Union broke treaties and ignored international law. Saying this made us feel self‑righteous and fed our nationalist impulses. However, we are sometimes guilty of the same fault. Our failure to cooperate in building a strong League of Nations certainly contributed to the outbreak of WWII. We used the World Court to help isolate Iran and secure the release of the hostages that Iran held in the late 1970s. But then we chose to ignore the rulings of the same court that our mining of the harbors of Nicaragua were in violation of international law in the 1980s. In 1990 we found ourselves once again supporting--and leading--the UN in actions against Iraq. But then in 2003 we decided to ignore UN resolutions and unilaterally invade Iraq (with the help of Great Britain and a few other allies – roughly 90% of the cost and troops from the outside are US – and since the invasion a number of countries that initially helped have withdrawn that help).

 

     In 1995 the U.S. unilaterally refused to pay our share of dues to run the United Nations. We owed nearly $2 billion. Traditional allies such as Great Britain threatened to move to have us forfeit our vote in the U.N. General Assembly until we paid our share of costs. The source of the refusal was not the executive branch, but the Senate, which was controlled by conservative Republicans, such as Senator Jesse Helms of N.C. During 1999 a number of well-known internationally minded Americans led a public relations campaign to try and win support for payment. Ted Turner, who also gave the U.N. a $1 billion private contribution over a ten year period, paid for media spots. The campaign was supported by former Secretaries of State from both political parties. Ultimately, the campaign was a partial success with the U.S. passing legislation to pay dues, but at a lower rate that was also contingent upon internal reforms within the U.N. Since then we have finally paid up our dues.

 

     Perhaps the problem is not with such entities as the World Court and the United Nations themselves, but rather with our expectations of what they can and should do and how quickly they can do it. We shall turn to that subject shortly when we talk about the differences between international politics and the internal politics of a nation such as the U.S.

 

     Before we go on, you should know a few things about the United Nations if you are to be intelligent consumers of international news. Let's start with the legal basis and structure. The United Nations is really nothing more than a treaty with 192 members who signed the treaty. Any one could withdraw at any time they want. The organization started with just 51 members and has grown throughout the years (see the UN page on growth at http://www.un.org/Overview/growth.htm.)

 

     At the center of the U.N. is the General Assembly. This is a very weak legislative type body in which each member state has a single vote and a representative who speaks for that nation and casts that vote. In this body, much like the U.S. Senate, all nations are equal in voting power, regardless of size or wealth or population. Its major weakness is that it cannot pass laws like other legislatures. The General Assembly can only pass resolutions and make recommendations. It meets for about two months each year beginning in September.

 

     The most important part of the U.N. is the Security Council. The U.N. Charter makes it responsible for "prompt and effective action...for the maintenance of international peace and security." The Security Council has 15 members five of which are permanent. These "perm five" consist of the major powers of the world‑‑at least they were the major powers at the time the U.N. was created at the end of WWII: The U.S., Britain, France, the U.S.S.R. (now replaced by a smaller and very much weaker Russia), and China (originally Nationalist China on Taiwan, but now mainland China, the People's Republic of China‑‑the PRC). The remaining 10 members serve for 2 year terms and are elected by the General Assembly. In order to pass a motion, the Security Council requires 9 votes. However, on important votes, none of the perm five can cast a "no" vote if the vote is to pass. In effect they have veto power over all key votes. During the Cold War period following WWII up until the 1990s, the conflict between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. caused members of the Security Council to cast many vetoes that stopped the U.N. from acting in any area where the two superpowers disagreed.  


     This method of representation and method of voting recognize that the perm five are so important that the U.N. could not be effective if any of them opposed action. So the rules require their representation and their support. If you remember Crick's law of politics, you might say that these rules distribute power in relation to the importance of each of the nations for the success and survival of the U.N.

 

     While the identity of the perm five made a lot of sense following WWII, it makes less sense today. The two major losers in WWII‑‑Germany and Japan‑‑are arguably much more important in the world today than several of the current perm five members. At some point in the future the U.N. must recognize this new reality. If not, the U.N. may find that it cannot effectively function on matters these economic superpowers oppose. It will have violated Crick's law (which states that for any organization to be successful, the powers of the members must be in proportion to their importance in that organization – you should have seen this in trying to allocate power in the Baltakian Convention simulation!).

 

     The last major organ of the U.N. is the office of the Secretary General. He or she is responsible for carrying out the policies passed by the U.N. and overseeing the day‑to‑day administrative affairs of the U.N. The post involves a great deal of delicate negotiation among members over whom the General Secretary has no real power to use force. The General Secretary has little more than the power of persuasion. Upon the recommendation of the Security Council, the General Assembly chooses the General Secretary. The current Secretary General is Ban Ki-moon, a career UN diplomat from Korea, who, who succeeded Kofi Annan of Ghana in 2006. Like Annan, Ki-moon received much of his higher education in the U.S. You can read his biography at the following UN website: http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/pages/sg_biography.html.

 

     The U.N. has a number of other special agencies, such as the International Court of Justice, the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization, the World Meteorological Organization, the Universal Postal Union, and the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). In 1984 the U.S. formally withdrew from UNESCO, feeling that it had become a biased organ of third world nations that were mainly interested in criticizing the U.S. and in taking the contributions of the U.S. and using them for things that were opposed by the U.S. 

 

     On balance, the U.N. is a necessary organization in a world where interactions among nations happen so frequently and in so many areas that we need a permanent structure for dealing with those interactions. (You may remember that this rationale is similar to Locke's argument about why people created government as an improvement over the state of nature.) Ad hoc arrangements would not be practical any longer. When major powers agree, the U.N. can be effective in stopping aggression, as in the case of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

 

     However, the U.N. suffers all of the inherent defects of a confederal form of government. It can only do those things on which all major members agree. If major members are unwilling to take sufficient risks, the U.N. can do little. Such was the case in ending the horrible ethnic violence in and around Bosnia or in restoring basic order in Somalia. It depends on members to pay their dues voluntarily in the sense that it cannot force members to pay.

 

     To learn more about current activities and elements of the UN, visit its website at http://www.un.org/english/.

 

 

   E. U.S. Foreign Policy

 

     Many schools teach courses that focus on international relations and comparative government from the focus of U.S. foreign policy. One might study bilateral relations, that is, the relationships between the U.S. and other single nations, or regional relationships, that is, with other regions, or multilateral relations, that is, relationships with many nations. One of the complexities of international relations is that each of these three areas of study affects the other. For example, United States' bilateral agreements with Israel affect regional relationships with the Arab nations. All the while both of these relationships affect U.S. multilateral relationships with nations not in that region on such questions as arms sales, nuclear proliferation, and the maintenance of oil supplies. We will have a separate unit on American Foreign policy shortly.

 

 

II. International Actors in the world community

 

     In discussing international politics, we must consider much more than how nations get along with each other. Nations are just one kind of actors‑‑many other entities are active in the world. What I want to do here is discuss a variety of other possible actors and raise some significant issues and problems that concern each type of actor.

 

     A. Individual Actors

 

     Individual people can often play an important role in international politics‑‑even those individual people who do not represent any other kind of unit. Quite obviously presidents and prime ministers and ambassadors are individuals who play important roles. However, a significant number of private individual actors can affect the course of events in world affairs either by acting or being acted upon. Victims of terrorism might better be seen as unwilling pawns, but the statements they make both literally and symbolically can have a great impact.  


     When former officials of high standing such as George H. W. Bush or Jimmy Carter make statements on foreign affairs, people and current world leaders listen. Carter does a lot of work through the Carter Center, located on the Emory University campus. Independent actions by internationally respected men like Carter can have a dramatic effect on world events, as we saw in his personal intervention in Haiti in September 1994. Backed by the U.S. military, he negotiated a peaceful withdrawal of the military bosses who ran the nation with an iron fist. The legally elected government of President Aristide came back into power and the waves of "boat people" attempting escape ended. Another recent example of someone who changed from public official to a private individual who has gained great international influence is Al Gore, who won the 2007 Nobel peace Prize for increasing international awareness of global warming. Following Jimmy Carter's model, former President Bill Clinton has his own foundation, the "Willian J. Clinton Foundation,"  that is very active in humanitarian activities around the globe.

 

     As mentioned earlier, in late 1997 Ted Turner announced that he was going to give a billion dollars to the U.N for humanitarian activities over a ten year period--a hundred million a year. That represents about a third of his wealth at the time. He clearly is an international actor.

 

     International currency trader George Soros is an international actor in several ways. His financial trading has made him billions, sometimes angering national banking institutions, like the Bank of England, from whom he made a quick billion when he correctly anticipated a falling pound. He borrowed pounds from the bank. The he used the pounds to buy German marks, which increased in value. Then he bought back cheaper pounds to repay the loan and had a billion left over. Soros also gives away hundreds of millions of dollars, especially to eastern European nations. His aid to some nations in 1996 was more than U.S. economic aid. He gave Hungary almost $16 million while the U.S. total was just over $15 million. He is funding a program in Russia that is trying to combat TB that is running rampant in Russian prisons (in 1998 an estimated one in ten was infected and one in twenty would die), where they do not have enough money to even pay guards, let alone treat disease. The danger is that the disease will spread to the general population. Soros in effect has his own foreign policy, promoting a free press, free speech and human rights projects all over the world. When Soros speaks, nations listen. When any businessperson makes a deal to shift wealth from one nation to another, nations can and often do react. 

 

    B. National Actors 

 

     There are about 200 nation‑states in the world that fit into this category. Notice that I said nation‑states, not just nations.  Sometimes the term nation refers to a people with a distinct culture and heritage that exist within some state but do not have the status of a state in international affairs. We could speak of the Cherokee nation within the U.S., the French nation within Canada, the Islamic nation within the USSR, and many nations (who had an open war for many years) within the very fragile and tentative state of Lebanon. In this last case, we have a state that was not really a nation.

 

     In most of the other cases we have nations that do not have the status of states. For example, the Serbian nation within the state of Bosnia has been at war with the state of Bosnia, which is supported by the Muslim nation that also lives there. Bosnia, along with Serbia (which is also a separate state outside Bosnia), Croatia, and Macedonia, now all states, were once three nations within the state of Yugoslavia.  During the Clinton administration, the nation of Kosovo, which is composed of mainly Albanian ethnic groups but was part of the nation-state of Serbia, was attacked by Serbs in an attempt to drive the ethnic Albanians out. NATO intervened and bombed Serbia and Kosovo for about 70 days before the Serbs withdrew. It is occupied by NATO troops along with some Russian troops, whose main job is now to protect the Serbs from retaliation from the ethnic Albanians.

 

     The most current examples are Iraq and Afghanistan along with perhaps Pakistan. In Iraq at least three distinct nations live in a great deal of tension. They are partially defined by religion (different sects of Islam: Sunni and Shia) and ethnicity, the Kurds in the North, who do not consider themselves Arabic. If Iraq does disintegrate into a total civil war, these will be the lines of conflict. In Afghanistan and in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, many ethnic groups live that feel they are separate nations, yet they are in theory under control of Afghanistan or Pakistan. Yet in reality they are under no real control at all. Protected by an incredibly tough terrain, they provide relatively safe haven for the Taliban and other groups who oppose the US and our allies.

 

     Disagreement exists over just who should be counted as nation-states, as political recognition by the rest of the nation‑states of the world is a highly controversial political question. For example, the nation‑state of China has been two different entities from the perspective of official U.S. policy in recent years. Following the victory of Mao Tse‑tung and the communist forces over the Nationalist army of Chiang Kai‑shek, the U.S. recognized Taiwan as the nation of China and had no formal diplomatic relations with the mainland, or the People's Republic of China (PRC). To have done otherwise would have resulted in an inconsistency in our opposition to the admission of the PRC to the United Nations, and the admission of PRC as China would, and eventually did, mean the loss of the vote of an ally we could generally count on, Taiwan (which was originally recognized as China in the U.N. as a result of our support).

 

     Under the leadership of President Nixon, we made the first moves toward the recognition of PRC as China. Why? Well, many explanations explain this shift. One is the fact that the U.S. finally recognized the political reality of the world when we came to realize that this reality was never going to change. A more crass explanation is that Nixon and his foreign policy advisor Henry Kissinger hoped to use our relationship with China as a diplomatic weapon in the ongoing cold war with the Soviet Union. This tactic was called "playing the China card," as though we were in some kind of international card game.

 

         C. Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO's)

 

     These are groups and associations that are not sponsored by any nation‑state or group of nation‑states that can and do play an important role in international affairs. Examples include such groups as the Red Cross, Amnesty International, Green Peace, the Cousteau Society, Doctors Without Borders, and thousands of religious organizations. The International Women's Conference held in the late summer of 1995 in China had in attendance hundreds of representatives from NGO's concerned with women's issues, including the one we shall now discuss.   

 

     The Catholic Church is an interesting case of a religious group that would usually be considered an NGO that has the legal status of a state in the world community (notice that I didn't say "nation‑state"). This is because the Catholic Church is located in Vatican City, which is within the confines of Rome, but is legally separate from Italy. It is, in effect, a state within a nation‑state (although it does not have state status within the U.N.). The reason for this is largely historical in that the Church played a role in European politics for centuries that has no parallel in the western world. The end result is that when the Pope travels, he is not only received as an important private person, but is also usually afforded the diplomatic status of the head of a state. As a result of the Catholic Church's special status, it participated fully as other states in the September 1994 World Population Conference. The Church led the opposition to family planning that utilized birth control devices and abortion. Although unsuccessful in blocking the passage of statements favoring family planning, the Church and nations allied with it did force compromises in the language of agreements that referred to abortion. It played a similar role in the 1995 International Women's Conference, though this time it was a little more willing to compromise.

 

    D. Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO's)

 

     The groups and associations that are formed by two or more nation‑states also play a very significant role in the world. All of you are familiar with such groups and organizations as NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization‑‑which is comprised of the U.S. and its military allies in Europe), the European Union (the economic and political association of Great Britain and mainly European nations that is growing out of the old Common Market, which was purely an economic arrangement), OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), and the largest of them all, the U.N. (United Nations). About 200 of these organizations exist in the world today. As you can see from the above short list, they affect everything from the price of gas that you put into your car to the military bases of the U.S. in Germany.

 

    E. Terrorist Organizations and/or Patriotic Fronts

 

    Given the horrific events of September 11, 2001, this is a difficult subject to discuss dispassionately. Nevertheless, the nature of this kind of international actor depends largely on your point of view.

 

     Let me give you this example. What would you call a group that purposely destroyed private commercial products, spread rumors and propaganda, ambushed soldiers, and endangered the lives of those civilians with whom they disagreed politically? If you were on the receiving end of all or any of this, you would probably call them all kinds of names I should not print. Almost certainly you would consider them terrorists. The history books you read in primary and secondary school classes called them the "Sons of Liberty," a highly patriotic group of good Americans who helped found the nation. From the British point of view, they were despised traitors who irresponsibly engaged in terrorist activities.

 

     Was the PLO (the Palestine Liberation Organization) a terrorist group or a patriotic front? How about Hamas, a competitor Palestinian group to the PLO that is even more extreme in words and actions? Certainly to those who suffer from their acts they are terrorists, but to those who feel that they were driven from a homeland that was rightfully theirs, they are patriots who must use whatever means are necessary to regain what is theirs and punish those who wronged them. A similar kind of statement can be make about the IRA (the Irish Republican Army) in Northern Ireland. We in the U.S. regarded the early 1980s bombing of the Marine compound in Lebanon as a terrorist act--the bombing killed nearly 300 soldiers. At the same time, many Lebanese regarded our practically indiscriminate shelling of Lebanese villages from the USS New Jersey an act of terrorism.

 

     Were the horrific acts of September 11, 2001 acts of terrorism? Most certainly virtually all Americans and indeed, most of the people of the world, would consider the killing of thousands of civilians to be acts of terror. Most would use even more extreme labels, like atrocity or crimes against humanity or simply pure evil. Yet, to some people who are radical Islamic fundamentalists, America and the West and all our values and religions are evil that must be stamped out at any cost. From our value system which embraces tolerance, these intolerant people are clearly wrong, to put it mildly. We feel justified in defending ourselves from them, even to the point of eliminating them from the face of the earth.

 

     Who is right depends on whose values you hold to be your own and who writes the history books. When the Zionists were fighting in order to create the state of Israel, a man who later became Prime Minister of Israel was a leader in an underground organization that was responsible for the bombing of a British occupied hotel in the area that killed many people. Menachem Begin retired from active politics in Israel in the early 1980s. The former head of the PLO, Yassar Arafat (now deceased), was branded as a terrorist by Israeli leaders, and later was recognized by Israel as the legitimate head of the nation of Palestine, which is slowly becoming a state with its own powers of self-determination through a long drawn-out process of negotiation. In late September of 1995 the parties met at the White House to sign an agreement on the next stage of the process--the withdrawal of Israeli troops from areas that will go under PLO control. More than a decade later that has not happened yet because of actions of extremist groups, such as Hamas, which has been in an internal battle for control of the Palestinian territories with the PLO. 

 

     Knowing all this does not make us any less angry when we or our friends are the victims. But understanding may help us in coping. And cope we must, because acts of terrorism will certainly be a political fact of life for a long time to come. 


     I know this sounds suspiciously close to the idea that might makes right. That idea does have a kernel of truth to it, despite Socrates' answer to Thrasymachus (do you remember that?). Another professor I know argues that the analysis I presented here is too simple, that it engages in too much moral relativism. He wants to draw a moral line. He feels a legitimate moral distinction can be made between terrorists and freedom fighters. His argument is along the lines of Machiavelli's economy of violence. Terrorists are more indiscriminate in their killing whereas freedom fighters try and limit their targets of violence to those on the other side. So they might not randomly kill shoppers in a store, but they might bomb a hotel in which military advisors to the other side were staying. They would go to some pains to minimize hurting those who play no role in the conflict. They would certainly not use plane loads of civilians to destroy high rise buildings of civilians, though they might ram an empty jet into the Pentagon. Of course, almost anyone plays some indirect role. For example, as American taxpayers, we paid for the shells shot by the USS New Jersey in Lebanon. Citizens of Britain supported the cost of British troops in Northern Ireland. So the line can become quite blurred.

 

     Despite the problems of drawing any line, it would certainly be easier to cope with the dangers of the day with some kind of clear line. Can we make a distinction between “collateral damage,” in which civilians are killed incidentally in actions aimed against military targets and when civilians are the primary targets of destruction? In fact, we do make this distinction in nearly every military act we take on as a nation. In only a few cases were the civilian populations the direct targets of American military action – like the dropping of atomic bombs on cities in Japan.  But even there we say that the object was NOT the destruction of noncombatants in time of war. Rather, we say it was to save lives by avoiding an invasion that almost certainly would have cost thousands of American lives and probably as many civilian deaths as the bombs took.

 

     Some analysts make a distinction between "old terrorism" and "new terrorism."  Old terrorism may have taken civilian lives, but the object was to persuade some governing authority to change their behavior. The IRA was trying to drive the British out of Northern Ireland, and the Sons of Liberty was trying to drive the British out of the American colonies. The Viet Cong were trying to drive the French and later the U.S. out of Vietnam, and when they did not have the military strength to do it directly, they employed terrorist methods to make the population lose faith that the government created by the French and later by the U.S. could protect them.

 

     The new terrorism, on the other hand, is not aimed at changing behavior so much as it is aimed at pure and simple annihilation. The enemy is seen as evil and must be eliminated at all costs. No change in behavior would be enough to stop these actions.

 

     This may be closer to what we see in the Middle East today and what we have experienced here at home. Radical elements among the Palestinians, such as Hamas, will settle for nothing short of the total destruction of the Israelis. Radical Islamics will settle for nothing less than the total destruction of all elements of western culture, and see the U.S. as the prime purveyor of that culture. But even here the line is not entirely clear. All of these radical groups might agree that they want to change behavior in the sense that they want Israel and all other Western countries and influences to totally withdraw from their area of the world. However, I doubt that they would ever be satisfied because withdrawal is not really possible without destroying all those millions of native inhabitants who have bought into the economic and cultural ideas of the West.

 

     Regardless of whether we see terrorists as pure evil or as enemies who must be controlled and eliminated where possible, we will have to deal in some way with these entities for as long as we can see in the future. It seems to me that our challenge is to do this without our destroying the very institutions of democratic tolerance and individual freedom that they wish to destroy. Some would say that we are doing just that in giving the president the power to declare someone a terrorist and then hold them indefinitely and even torture them without any legal recourse or protection.  

 

    F. Multinational Corporations (MNC's)

 

     Most of you probably didn't think about MNC's as international actors, but they are and they are very very important. To give you an idea of how important, the largest MNC's have more material assets than all but about the wealthiest 14 nation‑states. When the chief executive officer (called the CEO) of ITT or Royal Dutch Shell speaks, leaders of nations listen. 

 

     The largest of these organizations can play political hardball with the best of nations. When the elected socialist government Chile headed by Salvador Allende threatened investments held there by ITT and other American based MNC's, these industrial giants successfully placed pressure on the Nixon administration. The administration encouraged and aided elements in the Chile military that were more sympathetic to MNC's and the U.S. to overthrow Allende's government in 1973. The rebellious troops killed Allende in his presidential palace. Needless to say, many people there saw little difference between the United States government and these corporate giants. 

 

     In 1990 some critics of American Middle East policy charged that the U.S. was more interested in protecting the interests of the oil companies than in repelling aggression or in protecting American interests. Some liberal and conservative critics make this charge.  Can we conclude that what is good for Exxon is good for America? Or is access to cheap foreign oil vital for our economy and our way of life?  This is a tough call, as a reasonable case can be made for either side.  


     One of the most important issues facing nation‑states is the nature of their evolving political relationship with MNC's. What obligations do MNC's owe to the nations that host them? Do they have any obligation to be concerned about the welfare of the people of the nations from which they extract natural resources? Should they share technology and promote education and use natives in higher skilled jobs as opposed to bringing in their own people? What obligations do MNC's have to the nations in which they are based? Should an American based and owned MNC sacrifice profits in order to protect the national interest of the U.S.? When an American auto company finds that producing cars in the Far East is cheaper, should the decision to move be based solely on economic grounds? 

 

     We only have time to touch on these questions here. We should note that of course MNC's have to take into account political factors as well as economic factors. Few governments can afford to idly sit by and watch jobs and resources leave their nation with little given in return. You can be sure that the struggle will continue. If you want to know more, I would urge you to consider taking some courses in international relations or in international economics.

 

 

III. International politics versus internal state politics

 

     Many people want to approach the international arena with the same political understandings that works for them in the internal politics of their own nation. The underlying basis of international politics is vastly different from the basis of politics within most nation‑states.

 

    A. How different

 

     We can state the differences quite simply. No one has sufficient legal or moral authority in the international arena to force all or even the most important actors to comply with the law. International politics is by its very nature anarchic‑‑each actor is relatively free to play by their own set of rules‑‑IF they have the power to make them stick. (We will turn to the question of measuring power shortly.) The end result of both these differences is almost constant conflict. Even though conflict is a fundamental characteristic of the internal politics of any state, it is usually more severe and constant in the international arena. 


    B. Why different

 

     Anarchy is explained by the fact that within a nation the central government can enforce settlements of disputes because of its monopoly of power. If you or some group refuses to go along, you can be fined, imprisoned, or even put to death if the question is important enough. No central authority exists with enough power or legitimacy to make their decisions stick in international affairs. The example of the U.S. and Nicaragua and the World Court that we discussed earlier illustrates this point. If the U.S. (or any other powerful nation) says "try and make us comply with your findings because we don't recognize your authority on this question," the weakness of the World Court or the U.N. becomes obvious.

 

     Even lesser nations can defy international law if their defiance does not violate any vital interest of the powerful members of the world community. The Bosnian Serbs largely ignored U.N. and NATO threats in their war of "ethnic cleansing" against the Bosnian Muslims. The Serbs knew that no one was willing to make the sacrifice to force them to stop their outrageous behavior. Finally in the late summer of 1995 the Serbs came to the negotiating table after the NATO allies began sustained bombing of their military. But the exception proves the rule--an army of only about 80,000 defied all the world's military powers with armies of millions for several years.

 

     North Korea and probably Iran, which maintains that it is only building reactors for peaceful purposes, have been ignoring warnings and threats of many powerful nations about building nuclear bombs. The leadership of these nations might illustrate Machiavelli's warning about going too far. They both run the risk of military intervention, especially Iran, which Israel sees as a grave threat. 

 

     The reason for so much conflict is also partly explained by the lack of a central authority who can make settlements stick for all parties involved. But on a more fundamental level, the conflict is a result of the fact that the world consists of many diverse groups that have drastically different ideologies resulting in many different and conflicting notions of justice. What is justice for the Israelis is injustice for the Palestinians. What is seen as free market democratic capitalism by the U.S. is seen as capitalist imperialism by socialist nations. What is terrorism to some is patriotism to others. The world is NOT like a nation‑state which exists and continues to exist because on the balance more things bind the people together than tear them apart (along with the political skill to keep them together, of course). If you think back to systems theory, nations continue to persist because political leaders transform demands into rewards and deprivations that generate support. Remember? Differences and conflicting demands are so great in the world as a whole that no amount of political skill could make this kind of transformation on a world level. Demands far outweigh supports.


     Conflict is also the result of actions taken by leaders‑‑some purposeful, some mistaken, and some just plain foolish. Leaders may miscalculate the powers of their opponents. What they thought would be an easy victory may be nearly impossible.

 

     Examples of this are most plentiful and most tragic. The U.S. thought that American technology and know‑how could win a relatively quick and easy victory in Vietnam over a backward third world nation. The Soviet Union thought the same in Afghanistan, as did the US some 15 years later. Iraq thought that the turmoil in Iran following the overthrow of the Shah would allow it to win a quick easy military victory there. Later Saddam Hussein felt that the U.S. would have no major objections if he invaded Kuwait. The mixed diplomatic signals we sent him prior to his invasion contributed to this miscalculation. More than a decade later, his last miscalculation was whether the US would really invade in 2003. The Generals in Haiti thought that President Clinton's low standings in the polls would prevent him from ever going beyond threats in removing them from power. And U.S. planners for the second Iraq war thought that once Saddam's army was defeated and disbanded, the rest of Iraq would meet us as liberating heroes and we would not need a large occupation force to provide security and keep order. Need I mention Afghanistan, where we have been fighting for nearly a decade now. From these examples we can see that all kinds of regimes‑‑democratic, totalitarian, and authoritarian‑‑can misperceive and miscalculate.

 

     Leaders may not always act rationally. They may be blinded by ideological beliefs, religious beliefs, or simply mental illness to take actions that are self‑destructive and self‑defeating. Uganda strongman Idi Amin systematically and allegedly personally slaughtered his own countrymen. He acted in incredibly unpredictable ways that terrorized news reporters and his own supporters. For example, he liked to play basketball with an assortment of palace lackeys and visiting news reporters. Everyone was so afraid of him that no one would ever guard him seriously and certainly never score on him. Observers concluded that he suffered from severe mental illness. Many historians explain Hitler's increasingly irrational military decisions toward the end of WWII as the result of progressive mental illness. The Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the religious revolution in Iran, may well have destroyed and alienated much of his natural support in his nation as well as in the world as a result of his blindly following the dictates of his interpretation of the Koran. Muammar Qaddafi, leader of Libya, has often engaged in what many consider to be irrational and erratic actions, picking fights that he cannot win and making enemies that he need not make. No doubt some of this was to maintain domestic support and unity, but the excess that Machiavelli warned against seemed to be evident in the rule of Qaddafi.  Yet he seems to have recovered and recently has renounced terrorism and is seeking trade relations with the rest of the world. So leaders do sometimes change. Joseph Stalin (whose bloody purges and reign of terror within the USSR inspired the classic novel 1984) should also come to your mind in this context. He went much too far in pursuing power to protect himself from imaginary enemies everywhere, most certainly exhibiting strong paranoia. North Korea, mentioned earlier, may also serve as an illustration. On the other hand, there is some rationality to their actions in that actually having nuclear weapons my serve as a deterrent against US military action, as opposed to rumors of having nuc's (think Saddam). Furthermore, if one remembers the history of the Korean War, the North was forced to sign a cease fire because of threats made by President Eisenhower to use nuclear weapons of they did not negotiate. They have a long memory. 


     The antics of some of these leaders make interesting stories, but their impact can be quite real and devastating for those near them.  In today's world where more and more nations have access and use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, irrational actions and/or ideological blinders can make the unthinkable very real and important to us all. Is anything in the world worth blowing up the world for? To the irrational or the ideological religious zealot who looks only to the hereafter, the answer may, unfortunately, be "yes."

 

    If you think about all of this, you should not be surprised that Machiavelli saw the world as chaotic with only temporary periods of peace brought about by truly skillful politicians. This was true when he penned this idea. It is still true today.

 

 

IV. The concept of power in International Relations

 

     Because the power of a nation is so important in determining who can make their definition of justice stick in the world arena, those who study international politics must be very sensitive to the power of international actors. Not only must they attempt to measure the power that actors have, but they must also be sensitive to changing powers. We will focus our attention here to the power of nation‑states, but with a little thought you could apply these same measures to other actors in the international arena.

 

    A. Elements of power

 

       1. Human resources

 

     Here we are considering the people in a nation‑state or in any organization. We must consider both quantity and quality.

 

           a. Numbers‑‑less important 


     Certainly the number of people a nation has can be a very big plus in creating power. A nation can do a lot of things with a lot of people. It can occupy land. That is something that the nation of Israel must do if it is to hold onto the land that it controls militarily. As long as Arabs outnumber the Israelis on lands that they wish to be a part of Israel, those lands will be insecure. Therefore, the state of Israel has consciously promoted a policy that encourages Jewish people to emigrate to their nation. 

 

     Nations can also create armies with people‑‑assuming the people are willing, a big assumption that we will examine shortly. However, with modern weapons, large armies are less important than they used to be. 

 

     People are required to run an economy and build the infrastructure of a nation: roads, dams, factories, power plants, railroads, airports, and public buildings. China, having an ideologically committed population, has been able to use raw people power to build some of the infrastructure that would normally require more machinery to accomplish‑‑but they have not nearly accomplished as much as they would like. Thus we see China struggling to obtain the technology that large numbers of people cannot provide.

    

     Unfortunately, large numbers of people are more often a liability than a plus in determining power. Unless they have the desired qualities‑‑which is unusual‑‑they create a drain of scarce resources and many political problems when they exist in large numbers in a small area. If you think about it, most of the poorest nations of the world suffer from too many people relative to their other resources rather than too few. That is why China and India work constantly to reduce birth rates among their peoples.

 

          b. Qualitative characteristics‑‑more important

 

     Political leaders are more concerned about the qualities of the populations they do have than their numbers, and rightly so. For if they have the proper qualities, they can overcome either the lack of numbers or an excess in numbers.

 

             1) education

 

     Generally speaking, the more educated the population, the more powerful the nation‑state. Education increases many capabilities of a nation, especially those that depend on technology. The most obvious example here is nuclear weapons‑‑education and the technology that depends on education allowed a few nations to develop and build this ultimate weapon. It lends its possessors such great military power that it becomes irrational to directly attack them. Spending money on education is really spending money on defense. 


     Studies in recent years have revealed that increasing education is one of the best ways of decreasing numbers. More specifically, increasing the education of women may be one of the most effective methods of birth control! We are not talking about just sex education, but education in general. You see, education opens up other possibilities for self-support than just submitting oneself to ones husband.

 

             2) economic skills

 

     Certainly this goes hand in hand with education, but differences exist. One could have a population that has only limited formal education, but still has economic skills that could add to ones power. Third world nations that are beginning to emerge as industrial nations possess populations that have work habits that are compatible with the demands of modern industry. These habits include things like coming to work on time on a daily basis, deferring to authority, understanding how to follow directions, and some experience with technology and working with machines. In fact, these fundamental skills have enabled some of these nations to beat more educated nations in basic manufacturing. Why? Part of the explanation is that a relatively less well educated but still educated population does not expect the kinds of high wages that populations with very high education expect. This is why the textile industry moved from Great Britain to New England and then to the South in the U.S. and more recently on to South Korea and Taiwan and China and Mexico and even our old enemy Vietnam as the population of southern states in the U.S. has become better educated.

 

             3) culture and ideology‑‑nationalism

 

     Culture and ideology play a very important role in determining a nation's power. I mention both of these factors because they are not necessarily compatible. If culture and ideology conflict, then the nation certainly has internal problems that will result in a loss of power. For example, a democratic ideology that stresses popular participation exists most easily within a culture that allows some individual autonomy. Democracy becomes much more difficult if the population values family, kinship, tribal, and/or regional ties more than tolerance. (Iraq and Afghanistan?)

 

     Even in the U.S. we struggle a little with this conflict between a tolerant democratic ideology and less tolerant culture. Traditional religious cultural values often conflict with democratic values of equality before the law and protecting small religious groups from having the religious norms of the majority imposed upon them. For example, in the 2004 S.C. Senate race, Jim DeMint argued that openly gay people and pregnant single women should not be allowed to teach in the public schools (a statement he repeated in the 2010 campaign!). Applying these fundamentalist values to the right of public employment clearly comes into conflict with tolerance and equality under the law. While many of the most conservative residents of South Carolina may agree with DeMint, any serious effort to put his ideas into law would almost certainly be ruled unconstitutional. Sometimes intolerance does win out. States across the nation, including South Carolina, were busy enacting laws to prohibit gay marriage in the 2006. Ironically, only eight years before, the state finally got around to removing the prohibition of interracial marriage from the state's constitution. This was a legal remnant (though it was unenforceable because of federal court rulings) of another kind of cultural intolerance—racism.   

 

     In other nations that are industrializing, traditional religious values are in direct conflict with the values fostered by modern technology. The revolt of religious authorities against the threats posed to their leadership by western technology is one important explanation for the revolution that overturned the Shah in Iran. It explains the revolution of the Taliban against the western style government in Afghanistan. To survive, many traditional religions must shut out new ideas and behaviors. But technological progress requires that people be free to think and express new ideas and explore new ways of doing things. That is the basis for John Stuart Mills' defense of freedom in his classic work On Liberty.  Whether Iran can rebuild as strong an economy as existed prior to the revolution is questionable without once again threatening cultural values that depend on isolation for survival. Some in Afghanistan may choose poverty and technological backwardness to preserve religious purity. You can't have it both ways.

 

     Perhaps the best example of a nation trying to have it both ways today is China, which wants and needs internet access and a population skilled in computers to compete in the global economy. Yet at the same time Chinese leaders want to limit access to news and discussions on the internet because that could lead to calls for democracy and protests. A few years ago Bill Gates' company, Microsoft, agreed to help China set up their internet so that articles with words like freedom or democracy could be screened out. 

 

     Perhaps the most important kind of ideology for a nation's power is the ideology of nationalism. As mentioned earlier, many students of international politics consider nationalism to be the most powerful force in the world today‑‑more powerful than communism, capitalism, or any of the religious movements in the world today. By nationalism we simply mean placing devotion to ones state above all other loyalties. When these loyalties are joined with religious loyalties and ethnic loyalties, one has a force that is potent indeed. This is the kind of fanatical commitment that led young boys in Iran to volunteer to clear mine fields by walking across them‑‑a large nationalistic population can sometimes compensate for the lack of tanks. This is the kind of fanaticism that Russian soldiers saw in Afghanistan in the eyes of their foe who seemed to embrace death in battle: "You saw in their eyes that they knew how to die. After that we knew we would not win."

 

     You might ask what role nationalism is playing in our on-going low level conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq—how many will be willing to die for how long to get the US out? Despite our good intentions, have we kindled nationalism in Iraq that temporarily unites Sunni and Shia against the outsiders? Perhaps to be credible to its own people, the new governments of either country must demand that our military leave their nations. Paradoxically, they may need our military for security, but our presence also makes them less secure.

 

             4) unity and morale

 

     If a nationalistic ideology is held by virtually all of the population in a nation, then leaders will have an easier time in mobilizing their populations behind their policies. They will have to expend fewer political and material resources in dealing with internal dissent. They will also have a wider range of policies from which they can choose in the first place. A nation whose population is confident that they can be successful in their dealings with other nations is also more powerful in the sense that the people are more likely to follow their leaders in risk‑taking policies.

 

     As you should know from the history you have read about heady nationalist days of the early 1960s, being united and confident and willing to pay any price any place can also get a nation into trouble. Remember, Machiavelli warned about the dangers of over‑extending yourself. Nationalism is an ideology that can be blind one to reality as well as strengthen. 


       2. Material resources

 

     Many things fall into this category: fuels, raw materials, capitol, a state's infrastructure (we defined this earlier), and perhaps even geography could be included. In this sense, geography has served the U.S. well. The nation was isolated from natural enemies during times when the nation was not strong (late 1700s and early 1800s) and saved the nation from the material destruction of the world wars and gave the nation time to develop its rich natural resources. Unfortunately, today our dependence on other nation's resources, like oil, has reduced our power. That power loss may have also led us to expend human and material resources to protect energy resources—the Gulf War and perhaps the second Iraq War as well.

 

       3. Organizational capabilities

 

     Even if a nation has resources, a large and capable population, and a supportive ideology, the nation must also have the capability of organizing and mobilizing all these resources. What that requires is a bureaucratic network and skilled people to run the network. An intelligence and military bureaucracy is required to gain, analyze, and rationally decide how to use information about adversaries in the world.

 

     Even though organizational capability is an essential element in a nation's power, a danger inevitably accompanies this capability. When President Eisenhower left office in 1960, he warned the nation about what he called the "military industrial complex." He was talking about the alliance of military bureaucracy with the corporate bureaucracy to form an interest group that is powerful enough to lead the nation into an arms race for the sake of profits and promotions. More generally speaking, any bureaucracy may have self‑interests that can come into conflict with the national interest. The more well‑developed and sophisticated the bureaucracy, the better able it is to rationalize the nation's interest to fit its own interest. Critics of the Iraq War would likely cast Halliburton (Vice President Cheney’s former employer) in the role of the industrial side of the complex today.

 

        4. Leadership skill 


     One of the most important determinants of a nation's power is the political skill of its leadership. All that you learned earlier in the course from Machiavelli about the skills required of a "good" prince are relevant here. The better the leaders are at making realistic evaluations, at divorcing themselves of emotion, at recognizing and taking good advice, at talking to allies and friends, at remembering facts and details about the world, at understanding the fears and limits of their own people and of their allies and enemies, at playing roles in the drama of political theater, and at doing whatever is necessary at the right time, the more powerful a nation will be.

 

     Unfortunately, this is one area where the U.S. could improve its power quite a bit. One of the greatest problems we face in dealing with the rest of the world is our lack of understanding of the rest of the world and the lack of political skill of those whom we hire and send to do the job for us. For example, ambassadors are all too often appointed by presidents to pay political debts. Here are a few of hundreds of possible examples. In the late 1980s President Reagan "promoted" Margaret Heckler, the Secretary of Human Services who was deemed to be an incompetent administrator, to the lower paying position of Ambassador to Ireland. In 1994 President Clinton nominated Geraldine Ferraro, who had no foreign policy experience, to a key post representing the U.S. in the U.N. And in 2005 President Bush placed South Carolina's David Wilkins as Ambassador to Canada. Wilkins was the Republican Speaker in the South Carolina House of Representatives and reportedly had only been to Canada once in his life. His chief claim to fame is he helped Bush raise a lot of campaign money in South Carolina.

 

     Our ambassadors and diplomats and advisors change too frequently and rarely have any long‑standing of deep knowledge of the nation or culture with which they must deal. Few can read or speak the language of the natives where they serve. This ignorance prevents us from understanding and communicating. It also insults the people we wish to persuade. The message it conveys is that we really do not care. If we did, we would take the time to learn to communicate with others in their own tongue. 

 

     This is an area where the U.S. has been badly beaten by many competitor nations. United Nations Representative Jean Kirkpatrick stated in a speech in October of 1985 that the Russians were much better in understanding and playing the internal political game of the U.N. Their embassies coordinate policies with their U.N. representatives and their representatives make daily ongoing contacts with all the other nations. She made an excellent point‑‑experience and knowledge count. This point will be underscored in the book The Quiet American.

 

    B. Foreign aid‑‑military and/or economic

 

     Whether to give or not to give foreign aid, how much to give, in what form it should be given, and what we should expect in return have all long been extremely controversial questions in U.S. foreign policy.

 

     We should note at the outset that despite the controversy of these questions, the U.S. makes a relatively low effort in giving foreign aid. Certainly in absolute terms, the U.S. gives billions of dollars. But if we look at spending in terms of the size of our gross national product (GNP), the effort is less impressive. For example, in 1979 the U.S. gave less than .2 percent of its GNP in foreign aid while other western nations gave slightly more than .4 percent of their GNP in foreign aid (Farnsworth, Clyde H. "Aid to Foreign Countries? Even the Lip Service Gets Softer." New York Times, October 5, 1980, E‑3).

 

     These figures haven't changed much in recent years. In late 1997 Jimmy Carter made a speech in which he said the U.S. was the "stingiest" nation in the world in giving foreign aid. Moreover, when we realize that a significant part of the aid comes back to domestic interest groups that have a stake in all of this, the total is even less impressive. For example, tobacco has been counted as part of the "food for peace" program. Congress has required that 50 percent of all aid be carried by U.S. owned ships. Defense contractors lobby heavily for weapons given as aid to other nations.

 

       1. As a tool for power

 

     The usual justification for foreign aid is that it gains prestige and cooperative behavior for the giving nation. Unfortunately, little evidence exists that this is indeed the case. One study looked at votes in the U.N. and foreign aid given and found no significant relationship‑‑buying votes on the international level is tougher than it is in domestic politics! 

 

     One of the greatest single foreign aid gifts in modern history was the building of the Aswan Dam for Egypt. For many years the Russians and the U.S. competed with each other for the privilege of building the dam. The Russians won that battle, but they have much less influence with the Egyptians today than does the U.S. 

 

     If this is the case, then why bother? The answer is that you should bother precisely because the results are unclear‑‑aid may occasionally do some good for the giver nation‑‑you just can't be sure. (The Marshall Plan that put Europe back on its feet economically following WWII is an example of a great success‑‑such a great success that the U.S. now has a difficult time competing economically with many of these nations.) If you are uncertain and the stakes are as high as they are in international politics, what should you do? Should you spend or should you not spend? If you remember the lesson of the "Secret Defense Budget" game we played, you know that under conditions of uncertainty, you spend more in order to be as safe as you can. As long as the other side is spending, you can't afford not to take the risk. What is at stake is not only political alliances and support, but vitally needed resources such as oil and gas and other minerals. As long as other nations have resources that we need, we will give aid in an attempt to maintain good will--and hope that it helps.

 

       2. Normative considerations‑‑Why give foreign aid?

 

     Normative considerations provide an additional set of reasons to give foreign aid. Of course normative reasons are based on questions of good and bad—moral values. The Judeo‑Christian ethical values of the West urge us to give help to those who need it whether or not the help does any political good. To expect something in return violates these values. We could argue about whether the aid should be given on an individual voluntary basis or on a national basis where the individual taxpayer has little say (the stuff of political theory courses). But under these normative values, but the fundamental obligation to give remains.

 

     Let me end this discussion with one brief note. If we give on a normative moral basis, we should not expect gratitude in return. From the point of view of many people in poor nations, we are only returning a small part of the resources that we have robbed from the world in building our economic empire. To others, the gifts are simply a reminder of the disparity between their standard of living and our standard of living. If you can't understand this, try and think about how much you appreciate the birthday gift that some relatively wealthy relative gave you. You probably wondered why they did not give you more and at the same time you resented their wealth.

 

    C. The distribution of power in the world‑‑changing realities

 

     The chances of living in relative peace to a large degree depend on the distribution of power in the world. Great imbalances tempt stronger nations to conquer weaker ones. This has been especially true since the birth of nationalism in which whole nations are mobilized in a great cause to demonstrate and expand their greatness. What I want to do in this section is give a brief and simplified account of how power has been distributed in the world since the rise of nationalism.    


       1. Balance of power politics

 

     The first great military expression of nationalism was the success of Napoleon. He mobilized the masses of France in defense of the French Revolution and overran much of Europe. Having their very existence threatened, other nations and their peoples discovered their own versions of nationalism and eventually overcame Napoleon.

 

     I want to digress here for a moment to talk about how nationalism changed the nature of warfare. If you are fighting against a nation that has organized and mobilized its entire nation and economy in a war effort, then the soldiers are not your only legitimate targets. The whole population becomes your targets, which you must destroy or immobilize if you are to succeed. Nationalism led to the invention of total war (meaning that whole nations were supporting the effort rather than merely hired professional soldiers). The nuclear bomb can be seen as the ultimate weapon in the total wars fostered by nationalism because they are able to destroy an entire nation. 

 

     In any case, you may have read in your history books about Napoleon's demise at Waterloo. After that defeat, many of those who were at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 carefully calculated a settlement that would balance the powers of Europe. Much of the credit for understanding and implementing balance of power politics belongs to Tallyrand, the French political genius who survived kings and several revolutions. The end result was a peace among nations that was not broken by a major war for almost half a century. Had there been more Tallyrands on the scene, the balance of power that he orchestrated might have continued even longer.

 

     We might define this balance of power in terms of two conditions. First, a relatively equality powers must exist in which nations have no great outstanding grievances against each other. No grievance makes them have no great desire to threaten each other. This is why the terms of the peace must afford all major parties some satisfaction—even those that lost a war. Perhaps Tallyrand's greatest achievement was in protecting the interests of France, the aggressor and nation that lost the war. Second, and as a result of the first condition, nations must seek to limit the conflicts that they have with each other. Finally, when conflicts endanger the balance of power that exists, nations must create alliances to restore the balance.   


     As we noted above, these conditions held until roughly the middle of the 1800s, but then began to crumble until most of the nations of the world were dragged into world‑wide wars. One might view the world wars as efforts to restore a balance, but they might also be viewed as results of failures to maintain the balance in the first place. Certainly, the failure of the League of Nations and the humiliation of Germany following WWI created a political situation that violated the conditions of balance of power. Germany had a major grievance in the reparations they were forced to pay the winners of the First World War. And other nations were unwilling to form the necessary alliances and take the necessary actions to prevent an outbreak of the Second World War.    

 

       2. Tight Bi‑polar System

 

     The destruction and devastation of WWII and the invention of the nuclear bomb led to a new political reality in which classical balance of power simply could no longer work because many relatively equal powers no longer existed in the world. For a short while, the Americans had a monopoly on nuclear power in a greatly damaged world. But within a short period, the Soviet Union (the USSR) also developed nuclear weapons and became the chief competitor with the U.S. in the world.      

 

     We might describe this system as the tight bipolar system. It was characterized by having two superpowers that had a monopoly on nuclear weapons and who were so strong that all the rest of the world could not have defeated either of them. These two superpowers divided the world up into spheres of influence and expended great amounts of resources to maintain, expand, and block the expansion of the other.  Most conflicts in the world were either the result of tensions between the two or were increased by the tensions between the two. However, conflicts were limited by the fact that a balance of terror existed between the two that made trying to directly attack each other irrational. This situation characterized the distribution of power in the world from roughly the late 1940s through the 1950s. But realities were changing.

 

       3. Loose Bi‑polar System 

 

     As nations rebuilt their economies and developed technological capabilities, nationalism began to reassert itself in international politics. The alliances that both superpowers had so carefully built began to crumble.

 

     Within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance, nations began to question the leadership and reliability of the U.S. France, partly as an expression of national pride, felt she must have her own nuclear force. Why? The French did not believe that the U.S. would really risk New York in order to save Paris if the USSR attacked.

 

     Many third and fourth world nations, sometimes called "southern nations," began to stress that their position was nonaligned, that is, not in alliance with either the first or second worlds. The assumption of the U.S. that communists in the USSR and in China were a monolithic force united in opposition to the forces of democracy and capitalism proved to be false. The Chinese had as many differences as commonalities with their neighbor who had long been an enemy.  In short, nationalism was proving to be a stronger "ism" than communism. 

 

     Moreover, the nuclear monopoly was no more. The nuclear club, that is, those nations who either had or had the capabilities to quickly have nuclear weapons, began to quickly expand. (See chart below. Source: University of California San Diego Political Science Professor Branislav L. Slantchev; updated by Bob Botsch)

 

Declared Nuclear States

§             Russia: 8,400 warheads (11,000 km range) (just over 4,000 as of 2010)

§             United States: 10,455 warheads (13,000 km range) (just under 4,000 as of 2010)

§             United Kingdom: 200 warheads (12,000 km range)

§             France: 350 warheads (5,300 km range)

§             China: 390 (?) warheads (11,000 km range)

§             Pakistan: 24-48 (?) warheads (1,500 km range)

§             India: 18 (?) warheads (2,500 km range)

§             North Korea: announced it had nuclear weapon(s) on 11/17/02; withdrew from NPT 1/10/03 (As of fall 2004 claims to have about 6-8 weapons); reportedly tested crude weapons in 2004-5, and almost certainly tested a weapon in October 2006.

Suspected Nuclear States

§             Israel: believed to have over 100 warheads; neither confirmed not denied

States Trying to Acquire Nuclear Bombs

§             Iran: program slowed down after 1979 but believed to continue (IAEA report 11/10/03) and more recently suspected of being in the process of building nuclear facilities capable of producing sufficient weapons grad materials for nuclear weapons in 2008-9. 

Former Nuclear States

§             South Africa: voluntarily destroyed entire arsenal by 1991

§             Kazakhstan: voluntarily gave up former Soviet weapons

§             Belarus: voluntarily gave up former Soviet weapons

§             Ukraine: voluntarily gave up former Soviet weapons

States with Inactive Nuclear Programs

§             Argentina: program voluntarily shut down by 1990

§             Brazil: program voluntarily shut down by 1990

§             Algeria: program voluntarily shut down in 1991

§             Iraq: program dismantled by U.N. after First Gulf War

§             Libya: tried to gain weapons, but renounced effort in about 2004

 

     The issue of nuclear proliferation—the spread of nuclear weapons—was one on which both of the superpowers could agree. Both the U.S. and the USSR were better off when they held a monopoly. Indeed, the world was a safer and more stable place when fewer nations had the bomb. The danger of miscalculation, the likelihood of an irrational leader using the bomb, and the danger of miscommunication or accident were all greatly increased as more nations had a nuclear capability. 

 

     In sum, we can see that what we have labeled as the loose bipolar system describes a distribution of power in the world that made conflict more likely and more dangerous. Instead of just the superpowers and their allies, the world had many more independent actors who pursue their own goals as defined by their own ideologies.

 

 

       4. A "Uni-polar" World?

 

     In 1990 after the break up of the Soviet empire, President George H.W. Bush started talking about a "new world order." The idea was to make the UN stronger and combine the new economic interests of all nations into a world economy. All nations would become interdependent and have a stake in peace and stability. The interest of most all nations then becomes avoiding wasteful military conflicts.

 

     Would this combined interest be strong enough to check the aggressive nationalistic aims of many peoples all over the globe wanting to have their own states that embrace their own particular culture? It was strong enough to check the expansionist aims of Iraq in Kuwait. But was that just a special case where the self‑interest of the U.S. and Europe and Japan protecting oil reserves was the dominant explanatory factor? It was not enough to quickly end the nationalistic fighting in the former Yugoslavia--Bosnia. Ethnic wars continue to rage in Africa. The former USSR is torn with ethnic and nationalistic strife. Religious conflicts rage in the Middle East. By the early 2000’s, the new world order was looking more like a new world disorder.

 

     However, in recent years the world community has stepped in to stop the bloodshed in Kosovo and in East Timor—albeit very slowly and after many deaths. The world has also been slow in stopping mass killings in the Sudan in 2004-5. We are now trying to combat terrorism, and have cooperation among old Cold War enemies. Perhaps we should not expect the United Nations to act quickly given the principle of national sovereignty that is one of the cornerstones of international relations.  


     Some scholars describe this new world as uni-polar, that is, having only one superpower. To the extent that the U.S. is the only nation that has military power sufficient to be projected anywhere on the globe combined with great economic and political might, the world is perhaps uni-polar.

 

     But the extent of the U.S.'s edge, especially in economic matters and even in political matters, is in doubt. We are having trouble financing our military efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. And the doubt about the extent of our power grows. Japan is now the largest banking nation in the world. The combined economic power of the European Union (the EU) that is slowly coming into existence is about on a par with that of the U.S. With the spread of nuclear weapons and pressures to avoid costly wars in view of the U.S.'s own financial problems, one might question whether the military power of the U.S. will be dominant or practical to use in the future. How effective traditional military might is against terrorism is quite open to question.

    

     Indeed, the international system is in a period of transition. About the best that can be said of this new world is that it is safer in the sense that smaller nations are no longer in danger of being dragged into a nuclear conflict between two major superpowers. But it is perhaps even less stable in that more conflicts are likely to break out as the old superpowers are no longer capable of keeping their old allies and religious and nationalistic fanatics under control.

 

 

    D. Power rationally wasted—the arms race   

 

     Those who study international politics necessarily spend a great deal of time studying arms races and nuclear arms strategy. This subject matter can be highly complex and filled with jargon, as experts overwhelm their audiences with terms and words that they do not understand like "mutually assured destruction (the MAD strategy)," "MIRVing," and "throw‑weights." Many average citizens began to get concerned and involved in these questions to an extent that they never had before in the 1980s.

 

     Why average citizens became so involved is an interesting political question.  One columnist, Meg Greenfield, speculated that she felt something like a homeowner dealing with an aggressive roofer. When the roofer told her that she needed a new roof, she deferred to his expertise and said go ahead. When he told her that this wasn't good enough and strongly recommended a second roof on top of the existing one, she still didn't question him. But she began to wonder at the third and fourth roof. When he came back and told her she had to have a fifth and sixth, she said enough was enough and decided that a good dose of common sense was just as good as all of his supposed expertise. How many times did we need to be able to kill all of the Russians to deter their government from attacking us?  When  former Secretary of State Dean Rusk spoke at USCA in the Spring of 1984, he made a similar statement. He said that he sometimes wondered if the good people of his home in Cherokee County, Georgia didn't understand more about nuclear war than all the generals in the Pentagon.  

 

      In any case, citizens did get involved and the resulting nuclear freeze movement played a significant role in the 1984 presidential campaign‑‑not in terms of the outcome, but in terms of how the winner portrayed himself and how he set his agenda for his last term. Poll after poll showed that this was the one issue on which the incumbent was most vulnerable. The Reagan campaign spent a great deal of resources in creating the image of peacemaker for their candidate. When he proposed a new missile to be deployed, he even called it the "peacemaker." And President Reagan placed a very high priority on successful arms negotiations with the Soviets in his second term. Whether or not this effort was sincere or not may be irrelevant‑‑it was solid Machiavellian politics, and it worked!

 

     Was a never‑ending nuclear arms race inevitable? Were we in danger of adding so many roofs to the house that it would someday collapse from the sheer weight of it all? Would we build so many nuclear arms that their accidental use would someday be almost a certainty? These were all vital questions until the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s.

 

     These questions are not as vital today, though we are aware of the great strain that military spending places on our economy and of the difficulty of making a smooth transition to lower military spending. (If you don't believe this, ask someone living in Charleston, South Carolina, or in many other places where bases and defense industries have been closed or downsized--like here in Aiken.)

 

     As long as we were uncertain about what the other side was doing, we felt we had to build as many weapons as we could in order to be certain that we have a retaliatory force left if the other side should strike first. However, when both sides perceived that the other was not a threat and that the race was not winnable and an unbearable burden, the race proved not to be inevitable. Arms reductions seemed to be a simple matter of trust along with verification so that each side knows what the other is doing. However, as you should understand quite well by now, establishing trust is rarely a very simple matter. (Do you remember the Money Game and the War and Peace game?)

 

    E. Lines of Conflict

 

     In describing the conflicts that exist in the world, nations are often grouped together. One frequently used set of terms refers to the first, second, third, and even a fourth world. As the following discussion shows, some of these terms no longer make sense. Nevertheless, you should be familiar with the terms, because you will see some of them, most commonly the "third world," still used by the media and by diplomats.  

 

     Little agreement and precision surrounds the usage of these terms. The terms greatly overlap by taking into account slightly different combinations of characteristics. We shall organize our discussion around the various "worlds" and note similar and related divisional terms as we proceed.

 

      1. First World

    

     This term refers to industrial democracies that exist mainly in Europe and North America, but also include a few other nations such as Japan and Australia that are industrial democracies located elsewhere. They number about 25. A similar term is western bloc, or simply the West, where the western refers as much to culture and style of economy as to geography.

 

      2. Second World

 

     This term generally referred to what used to be the communist nations. This included the Soviet Union and its allies. A very similar term is Eastern Bloc nations, or simply the East. This group included not only the industrial allies of the USSR, but also the non-industrial allies that might otherwise fall into other worlds.

 

     With the break up of the Soviet empire the distinction between the first and second worlds has changed. Many of those nations in the second world are making dramatic moves toward democracy with mixed economies. To the extent that they become industrialized democracies they will become part of the first world. A number of them, such as Poland, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia are now in the European Union. The real question at the turn of the new century is in what direction the heart of the old USSR will go. Russia in 1998 was on the verge of economic collapse. NASA was requesting additional funds from Congress so that it could assure that Russian space workers would get paid for their part of the space station program. The situation was very bad indeed--none of us are safe when desperate people have nuclear arms. In the last several years the economic situation has improved, but the Russian leadership, led by former President Putin, who was also former head of the Russian intelligence agency, the KBG, seems to be turning to authoritarian methods to maintain political control. The final result is still an open question. In sum, we no longer have a second world. It is on the ash heap of history. But the coals are still hot enough to ignite a fire that could harm us all.

 

      3. Third World 

 

     The third world makes a distinction mainly on economic grounds and includes those nations that are beginning to develop a significant industrial capacity. Developing nations is a very similar terms that generally describes the same group. China, North Korea (South Korea has developed so much in recent years that it may be considered a first world nation today), India, Mexico, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Pakistan are all examples of third world nations. However, with its growing economic might, China might well be considered part of the first world, at least in economic terms.

 

     You should note that the above list of examples differ from each other in many ways. Some are quite rich (from an abundance of natural resources rather than industrial development) and some are quite poor. Some are democracies to varying degrees (India, Mexico), while others are the worst kind of dictatorships (North Korea). They were split in the alliances they had with the first and second worlds. Some considered themselves aligned with neither. They called themselves the non aligned nations. With the break up of the Soviet empire, the idea of alignment is becoming irrelevant. Indeed, one of the major questions facing the first world is whether there is any role left in the world for their military alliances, like NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization). NATO is taking initial steps toward bringing Russia and many of its former second world allies into the military alliance.

 

     Some nations, like Cuba, are "left-overs" from the old Soviet Empire. Today, Cuba sees itself as the true champion of communism following the internal collapse of the USSR. Even though Cuba survives, survival is much more difficult now that it no longer has aid from a superpower. The remaining superpower, the U.S., is still isolating Cuba. One of the foreign policy questions facing the U.S. is whether it is still in the national interest to isolate Cuba. One could argue that the fastest and least painful way to change is to build economic ties with the Cubans. But U.S. internal politics affects international politics. Older Cuban Americans are strongly opposed to any normalization on ties with Castro, and they are an important voting bloc in Florida, a state with many electoral votes in presidential elections that both parties want.

 

     With the disintegration of the second world and the reason for having a first world in question (that is, balancing the military power of the second world), most observers agree that the most important force in the world is nationalism, not capitalism or communism. Many observers, including this one, argued that nationalism was more important than the struggle between capitalism and socialism long before there was any sign of the Soviet break up. Nations in the third and fourth worlds have sought help wherever it is available for a long time. They were more interested in help than in strong friendship or ideological commitment to either the first or second worlds.  

 

     These nations were often quite successful in playing the U.S. and USSR off against each other. For example, in the fall of 1985, Imelda Marcos, wife and powerful first lady of the rather autocratic and corrupt Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos, announced that she was going on a friendship visit to the Soviet Union. One explanation to this rather surprising visit was that the Marcos government was subtly telling the Reagan administration to stop its criticism if it wishes to retain the "friendship" of the Philippines, along with the military bases the U.S. had there. Of course, now Marcos is gone‑‑but the departure wasn't because we pushed him out. He simply was a poor Machiavellian Prince in the same way that the Shah of Iran was. He lost the support of too many of the poor and powerful people in his nation. U.S. military bases located there are also gone. The U.S. flag was lowered over the base at Subic Bay for the last time in the fall of 1993. Without a Soviet threat, the U.S. had no real need for a base any longer.

 

     While no one can play the Soviets off against the U.S. anymore, the new question today is whether they can play the terrorist card. For example, why are we supporting an authoritarian government in Pakistan today? You know the answer.

 

      4. Fourth World

 

     The fourth world also identifies nations on purely economic grounds. Here the commonality is simply extreme poverty. Fourth world nations have a per capita (that means per person) yearly income of around a few hundred dollars. Americans, with a yearly per capita income of well over twenty thousand, have a difficult time even imagining such total poverty. We have recently become more aware of it with the publicity of the famine in African nations such as Chad, Niger, Mali, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan. In the summer and fall of 2005, some 30 million people in sub-Saharan African reportedly were facing starvation because of drought and rising food prices along with political instability. Within our own hemisphere, such nations as Haiti and the Dominican Republic have this dubious distinction. We shouldn't be surprised that starving people often take incredible risks to reach our shores. When you're starving, the risks are not all that incredible. What would you do if you found yourself born into such a society? 

 

     Another term that is often used to include both third and fourth world nations is the South. When those in international relations talk about North/South conflict or tensions, they are not talking about the Mason‑Dixon line, but rather about economic conflicts between poor nations (most of whom exist in the Southern hemisphere of the globe) and the relatively wealthy nations (most of whom exist in the Northern hemisphere of the globe). 

 

     Most political observers now argue that the North/South conflict is a more important one that is the East/West conflict, which preoccupied U.S. politicians during the Cold war years after WWII. An important North/South issue is international debt. Third and fourth world nations owe incredible amounts of money to first world nations and financial institutions. They cannot pay even the interest on these loans. Their leaders have difficulty asking their people to endure an even lower standard of living to pay debts to nations that already have much higher standards of living. You can see how this can be an issue on which emotional popular appeals can be made to the poor masses‑‑a perfect issue on which politicians can arouse great resentment and passion.

 

    F. Revolutionary power

 

     One of the most problematic areas of American foreign policy is in deciding how to deal with revolutionary movements in third and fourth world nations. American policy makers often seem to be in a "catch 22" situation where no matter what they do, they lose. This is what happened in Iran, in Nicaragua, and in the Philippines. 

 

     Both choices are bad. If they support the usually corrupt autocratic regime that is in power, they waste resources in support of an undemocratic loser.

 

     On the other hand, if U.S. policy makers decide they want to support the revolutionaries, other problems arise. In the first place, supporting revolutionaries is a more difficult policy to sell domestically. It would be opposed by a variety of interests: business interests that have investments and profitable relationships with the existing government (the CIA helped overthrow the government in Chile during the Nixon presidency at the behest of ITT-- International Telephone and Telegraph), conservative ideological interests who view the revolutionaries as socialist, military interests that have relationships with the existing government, and humanitarian and some liberal interests that oppose any policy that supports acts of terrorism. Given the nature of our open system and the expectations that exist for political leaders, such a policy would be most difficult to hide and potentially very damaging if‑‑or perhaps I should say when‑‑it becomes known. Today we certainly know that presidents can't hide anything very well! 

 

     Anytime you pursue a secret foreign policy, you run the risk that it will become known and hurt you. For example, late in the 1992 presidential campaign the public learned that the U.S. had helped the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein build his military capabilities through agricultural subsidies that the U.S. knew were being used for military purposes. These revelations did not help Bush in the final weeks of the campaign. They put a bit of tarnish on his great military victory in the first Gulf War.

 

     Even if the U.S. were able to topple existing regimes, no guarantee exists that the new rulers would be any better than the former ones. The U.S. has overthrown Saddam Hussein. Will his replacement be any better? If Iraq breaks up in a civil war, which could happen after we withdraw, will the Iraqi people be better off, even as terrible as Saddam was?  We have driven much of the Taliban into the rugged mountains of the area surrounding the borders of Afghanistan. But they are not destroyed and have started their own low level civil war with the new Afghan  government we helped put in place along with our NATO allies. But the new government is proving to be very corrupt and not terribly popular. You might remember that we helped the Taliban and other religious groups to get rid of the Soviet sponsored government that was there in the 1980s. Now we are encouraging the Soviets to help us in keeping the Taliban at bay. These are indeed strange turns in events and alliances! One of the many things that Machiavelli taught was the coups and revolutions do not necessarily make things better. We live in a world of constant change—chaos. As the maxim says, "better the devil I know than the one I don't know."

 

     The U.S. has usually tried to force reforms upon corrupt autocratic allies. This strategy also has risks, for a little bit of reform can be a dangerous thing. Those who study revolutions have found that demands are likely to intensify just when conditions are becoming better.

 

     This rather surprising finding can be explained in terms of how reform affects people's perception of their deprivation and their expectations. As long as things are hopelessly bad, most people usually adjust and survive‑‑human beings are amazingly adaptable creatures. Of course all don't, but ruthless regimes can usually deal with the few who do not without too great an expense. However, when changes are made that give the masses hope, all of the pent‑up frustration is transformed into rapidly rising expectations that no government can expect to meet. Soon governments that hoped to quell dissent with moderate slow reforms are overwhelmed by a mass revolution.

 

     Political scientists call this a revolution of rising expectations in which the politically important deprivations are relative to what people expect, not to any absolute standard. Therefore, one of the most revolutionary things you can do in a nation is to introduce hope, whether by political reform or by simply introducing people to the rest of the world and better ways of life through the mass media (all this takes is a radio station and a few transistor radios).

    

     If you think about it, this idea of a revolution of rising expectations applies rather well to the situation in the republics of the former Soviet Union in the 1990s. The great fear is the new democratic governments will be unable to provide a better standard of living and that impatient people will turn to new sets of dictators or religious fanatics who may even be worse and more dangerous than the old communists were. In fact, some of them may even be the old communists! In fall 1995 local elections in some Russian cities the Communist Party candidates took nearly all the local legislative seats. In 1998 President Yeltsin was forced to come to terms with the Communists in the Russian Duma (legislature) in naming a new Prime Minister. By 2008 President Vladimir Putin, formerly head of the USSR's intelligence service, the KGB, had used up his two allowed terms as president. But he held on to power by becoming Prime Minister and selecting a hand-picked president. He has been popular because he is associated with growing prosperity based on oil revenues and promises of regaining international greatness. Russia is moving back to an authoritarian state. 

 

     Should the U.S. support reliable but corrupt allies who totally repress their people but keep them in line and maintain order? We did this in the past because there was another superpower that we needed to counterbalance. Now we are tempted to do the same thing to keep religious fanatics from taking over or from waging terrorist wars against us. I cannot give any definitive answer. It must be done on a case by basis.

 

     Even taking the moral high ground and rejecting all ties with corrupt regimes has risks. The popular masses who take over may hate us and try to destroy us. 

 

     The major point here is that all possible policies have risks. The U.S. should consider what is politically possible, weigh the risks, and do the best it can to do what is necessary. This requires a great deal of knowledge about the nation in question and a great deal of political competence and skill. If you remember Machiavelli, this should be familiar to you. It also takes us to our next topic in our next chapter—American foreign policy.

 

 

KEY TERMS:

 

international relations

international studies

international politics

international organizations

international law

United Nations

General Assembly

Security Council

perm five

Crick's Law

Secretary General

Ban Ki-moon

U.S. Foreign Policy

bilateral relations

multilateral relations

individual actors

national actors

nation-states

nation

Mao Tse-tung

Chiang Kai-shek

People's Republic of China

Henry Kissinger

non-governmental organizations

NATO

European Community

OPEC

terrorist organizations

patriotic fronts

PLO

Hamas

IRA

Old terrorism

New terrorism

Multinational Corporations

Ayatollah Khomeini

Mummar Qaddafi

elements of power

infrastructure of a nation

nationalism

military industrial complex

amount of U.S. foreign aid

balance of power

Napoleon

how nationalism changed warfare

total war

Congress of Vienna

Tallyrand

tight bipolar system

superpowers

spheres of influence

loose bipolar

balance of terror

nonaligned nations

nuclear club

nuclear proliferation

arms race

nuclear freeze movement

first, second, third, and fourth

   worlds

Eastern Bloc nations

developing nations

South nations

North/South conflict

catch-22 situations

revolution of rising

   expectations

Vladimir Putin