Chapter 6. U.S. Defense Policy: How Much is
Enough in a Changing World?
Last updated 11-12-2010
Copyright 2008-9 Robert E. Botsch
War is much too serious a thing to be left to military
men. Talleyrand
Prologue: This module contains both
factual material and a bit of editorializing (that is, I move over from “is”
theory to some “ought” theory.) I make
this statement in the spirit of "post-behavioralism,” which says one
should carefully lay out your values to the audience! You are responsible for
knowing the facts only. But I hope you
will analytically and critically respond to the editorial positions I take.
Note: I usually update chapters each
year. The last complete update to this module was in the fall of 2003. Since
then I have only done some minor updates, including 2005, 6, 7, 8, 9, and now
2010. I have left intact some of what I said about Iraq
before the Iraq
invasion. You will have to be the judge on whether I got most of it right or
not.
OUTLINE
I. Central
Question
II. U.S. Defense
Policy History
III.
Contemporary Needs and Concerns
IV. When To
use Force
A. Theoretical Guidelines
B. In Practice
V. Looking to
the Future
TEXT
I. Central
Question
“How much is enough” is the single most fundamental question
every nation must answer in planning its defense policy. The answer to this
simple sounding question is rarely as easy as it was in the “Secret Defense
Budget” game. In the real world you usually don't know exactly how much the
other side can lie by or hide and you may not even be sure who the other
side will be. The dramatic changes we are seeing in the world today have
added even more complexity. The breakup of the Soviet
Union and its empire has added new players to the game who are not
bound by the rules that were once imposed on them by the Soviets. The challenge
of terrorism means that we must try to defend ourselves from both low tech and
high tech weapons. Thus, we are continuously reconsidering our answer to this
fundamental question of how much is enough. Any answer we have will only be
temporary.
II. U.S. Defense
Policy History
A brief review of U.S.
defense policy history since World War II will help us understand the dilemma
the U.S.
faces today. Although defense policy has had many dimensions, the main focus in
the last half of the 1900s was on nuclear weapons. Ironically, the nuclear bomb
was the weapon that made us a superpower and it was also the weapon that most
threatened us. Today nuclear weapons continue to be a great concern for two
reasons. The crumbling of the world's second superpower has created the
possibility of the loss of control over many weapons and the expertise to build
such weapons. So let us consider the question of “how much is enough” thinking
first about nuclear weapons.
Immediately following World War II the answer to the question of how
much is enough was fairly easy. As long as the U.S. was the only nation that had
nuclear weapons, it could deter any immediate attacks with the threat of massive retaliation.
However, the massive retaliation answer proved sufficient for only a few
years. The Soviet Union quickly developed its
own weapons. In the early 1950s the U.S.
also found in Korea that
merely having nuclear weapons did not deter other nations from attacking U.S. allies
with conventional forces. Nevertheless, Eisenhower's threat of using nuclear
weapons did ultimately bring that regional conflict to a halt. But nuclear
weapons did not give the U.S.
a clear victory. The U.S.
needed a new answer that was not entirely nuclear.
Based upon the Korean experience and later what the U.S. saw as aggression in Vietnam, a new
answer began to evolve‑‑flexible
response. The U.S.
still relied primarily upon its ability to inflict massive nuclear destruction
on those who would attack the nation directly. Americans were frightened when
they saw the Soviets developing rocket capabilities. America began pouring massive
amounts of money into science, engineering, and into a space program in the
late 1950s. About the same time the U.S. also began to develop new
kinds of units designed to fight guerrilla forces wars using what were called
"counter‑insurgency"
tactics. This was the premise of the Green Berets. They and the American
“can-do” attitude were supposed to enable us to win in places like Vietnam.
A great shift in nuclear strategy took place following the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviets,
feeling that their own nuclear capabilities left them far short of what was
enough, tried to quickly catch up by placing warheads ninety miles off the Florida coast. As all
who lived through that tense time remember, Kennedy and Khrushchev played a
game of nuclear chicken in which roughly 4,000 U.S. warheads caused the Soviets,
with their few hundred, to blink. (By
the way, you can see an excellent “docu-drama” about that crisis in the 2001
movie “Thirteen Days.”)
The result was a "never again" vow on the part of the Soviets.
They embarked on a catch‑up race. They went on a massive building
program. The U.S.
responded. Both sides built more and more missiles. Both worried about whether
they had enough. It was like playing the Secret Defense Budget game without
knowing how much you needed to spend to be safe from attack. So you spent and
built as much as you could. Each side was concerned about the other side having
what was called "first strike
capability." This refers to the ability to destroy the other side's
weapons by shooting first thereby rendering them incapable of striking
back. Attempting to achieve invulnerability through such measures as increasing
the mobility of weapons or hiding them in protected holes in the ground –
concrete hardened silos -- became more important. This improved second strike
capability, the ability to withstand a first strike and then strike them back
and inflict unacceptable damage on them. But these measures also made each side
less sure about what the other actually had. So the whole process of trying to
achieve security created additional incentives to build more weapons.
New technology like MIRV's
(multiple‑targeted independent reentry vehicles), SLBM's (submarine launched ballistic missiles), and more accurate
missiles and more easily concealed missiles (like the cruise missiles)
increased uncertainty even more. Even defensive systems, like SDI (the Strategic Defense Initiative,
popularly known as "star wars"), increased the speed of the race. Any
attempt at defense would be seen by the other side as a possible way to gain
the ability to strike first and be able to withstand the response. “How much
was enough” kept increasing.
By the mid 1960s the guiding philosophy of massive retaliation made no
sense whatsoever. The new strategy created by both sides having large nuclear
arsenals was known as MAD‑‑mutually
assured destruction. “MAD” was an appropriate acronym because the arms race
seemed "mad" in many respects. By the late 1980s both sides had
roughly 14,000 warheads, enough to destroy the world as we knew it many times
over. With more weapons, the problems of command and control increased and the
risk of accident grew. Neither side seemed able to escape. Testing these
weapons that were supposed to protect us threatened us – the snow that fell
from the sky and the milk we drank in the 1960’s began to have traces of
radiation. (The psychology of this situation is perhaps best captured in the 1960’s
movie “Dr. Strangelove,” a movie that all educated people should see at least
once in their lives.) The best that could be done was slow the race down a bit
in a series of arms agreements. We began to do this with a ban on atmospheric
testing and later a ban on anti-ballistic missile systems (the ABM Treaty,
which the Bush administration wishes to abandon in order to build the SDI
system).
The race placed a heavy burden on the economies of both sides. The
economic burden proved unbearable for the Soviet economy. That, along with a
new generation of leaders and followers who took incredible personal risks to
bring about change within the USSR
and Warsaw Pact nations, brought about the breakup of the USSR and its
allies. The answer to the question of “how much is enough” began changing
dramatically.
With a fast fading "evil empire" (President Reagan’s term for
the USSR),
serious reductions in nuclear arms began taking place. Shortly, the U.S. and the component nations of what used to
be the USSR
will be down to well under half of what they had at their peak. But agreements
are not always easy. Although the Russians signed the Strategic Arms Reductions
Treaty II (START II) that promised to reduce arms to no more than 3,000 to
3,500 warheads, the Russian Duma (legislature) has refused to ratify it.
Nationalists and still defiant communist members feel that it put them at a
disadvantage. The US
has its own problems in finalizing agreements as well. The Republican majority
in the Senate in the fall of 1999 refused to ratify the comprehensive nuclear
test ban, even though the President Clinton had signed it. It had been signed by over 150 other nations,
but thus far only a little over 50 have ratified it. Just like you in the Money
Game simulation at the beginning of the semester, senators did not feel they
could trust other nations enough to say we would forego underground nuclear
testing ourselves, even with sophisticated monitoring equipment. Nevertheless, leaders continue to negotiate.
In the summer of 1999 the US and Russia agreed to begin a new round of talks
(START III) that will further reduce warheads to between 2,000 and 2,500, even
though the last reductions have not yet been met (Barry Schweid, "US,
Russia to Seek," The State, July
28, 1999, A4). Little more than talks took place until 2003 when the U.S. and Russia signed the Strategic
Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) that calls for about the same limits, in the
range of 2,000 weapons. That treaty set little more than a goal, with little on
tactical weapons or the destruction of existing strategic warheads.
As of this
writing (fall 2010), the Obama administration has made significant progress in arms control with
Russia,
having signed a new treaty in April of 2010. It would further reduce the current
numbers of nuclear weapons from about the 4,000 each side currently has to about
1,500 each. But Republican opposition has prevented ratification in the Senate
as of this writing. However, both sides have agreed to continue to abide by the
existing treaty until the new agreement is ratified. So the talks continue, but
more with Republicans than with the Russians! Some agreement will probably be
eventually reached because it is in the interest of both sides to reduce arms
and spending. Neither can afford to waste money on nuclear weapons in light of new
defense needs in combating terrorism and in light of economic needs.
The
horrific attacks on the World
Trade Towers
and the Pentagon and perhaps other places have led to further change in US
Defense policy. The Bush administration called the new policy the “Bush
Doctrine.” It asserted that the US would make preemptive military
strikes anywhere in the world where it saw the danger of a terrorist attack,
with or without the approval of allies or the United Nations. In a sense this
took our foreign policy a full circle to the years preceding WWII when our
policy was to take unilateral action and avoid alliances.
While
this policy certainly had emotional appeal and seemed highly justified in clear
cases where plans are made like the ones carried out in September 2001, it was
not without risk – great risk. Once we set the precedent that we may attack any
nation that posed a threat, did not that give license to others to do the same? South Korea and North Korea? China and Taiwan? Israel and any of the Arab nations
that have threatened her existence? India
attacking Pakistan because
they know that Pakistan,
unlike Iraq,
already has nuclear weapons and the ability to deliver them and has clearly
threatened their use? Where would it all stop once the precedent is set?
Setting
off conflagrations around the globe among nations that have nuclear weapons is
not the only danger, even if it is the most dramatic danger. Machiavelli warned
that “the ambition of men is such that, to gratify a present desire, they think
not of the evils which will in a short time result from it.” It is our ambition
to find security, and we have developed great pride in our military might
(pride or “hubris” is another danger). We might overextend ourselves across the
globe into nations that we feel pose a potential danger to ourselves. The evil
that will come is that we will create enemies where we at least had shaky
alliances before. We might spend our wealth in trying to maintain security across
the globe, not this time in the name of containing communism, but in the name
of containing and destroying terrorism. It has happened before to other great
empires. It happened to us in Vietnam,
and even the success of the Gulf War in the early 1990s should not erase that
memory. We should have learned from all of our history that we are better off
not going it alone. We had many allies in WWII, relatively fewer in Korea, a world alliance in the Gulf War,
European support in Bosnia
and Kosovo, and world support in our war to topple the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Indeed, one could argue that we had no choice in that war because we were
attacked and the Afgans openly gave safe harbor to those who attacked us. But
how long do we stay there after we go in? How long do allies stay with us
when we have alienated them by going it alone in another way they were opposed
to? And that gets us to Iraq.
(Note: I wrote
the next paragraph just before the Iraq War began. The initial shooting phase
was over fairly quickly and cheaply in both lives and money – but the low level
conflict that has followed has cost us over 4,400 military lives (as of October
2010), well over
30,000 wounded, and thousands more civilian lives (counting the lives of our
allies in Iraq), and about over a trillion dollars as of 2009. Some estimates
that count long-term costs, including cost to help wounded with life-long
disabilities, and indirect costs are in the range of $3 trillion.)
Iraq is different.
Containment has largely worked. Saddam is certainly evil and homicidal, but he,
unlike the crazies who flew those planes, is not suicidal. Threat of
retaliation does keep him in check. He is most likely to strike when he is
cornered and feels he will die regardless of what he does. So we do have a
choice. And that choice should take into account what we will do after the war,
even if it is a relatively cheap and easy win. The cost of peace may be far
higher after the shooting is over. What will long-term American occupation say
to all the people of the region who already hate our influence and culture? How
many more enemies will it create? Are we prepared to pay the cost of “the evils
that will in a short time result?”
President
Obama changed the unilateralist Bush doctrine shortly after he came into office
in 2009. He pledged the U.S.
to work with allies and in concert with international organizations—a multilateral approach. That in effect
takes us back to the position that the first President Bush laid out after the
end of the Cold War around 1990.
III.
Contemporary Needs and Concerns
So how much is enough today, at least in so far as nuclear weapons and
deterrence are concerned? Back during the 1960s, then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara calculated that the U.S. needed 400
warheads to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviets. Fear of first strike
capacity complicated that calculation. Other experts have calculated that somewhere
in the range of 500 warheads would be sufficient to deter any rational opponent
today. No one except the Russians could even come close to knocking out
that force with a first strike.
While all of this is hopeful, three major areas cause worry: nuclear
proliferation, nuclear terrorism, and stability of governments that have
nuclear weapons, including Russia.
Nuclear proliferation may be the
single greatest remaining concern. During the Cold War more and more
nations felt they needed nuclear weapons of their own either to gain an
advantage over their enemies or to prevent being intimidated. The so‑called
"nuclear club" now
includes about nine nations with a handful of others that could develop them
(see the table in chapter 5). Most notably, Iran seems intent on developing its
capability. A continued danger exists of proliferation as third world nations
seek weapons from former Soviet republics that are in desperate economic
straits. Moreover, one of our allegedly best allies, Pakistan, has been willing to sell
nuclear technology. Proliferation makes control and agreements more difficult,
and it increases uncertainty and adds to the likelihood of accidents.
Proliferation of weapons to terrorist groups is a closely related grave
concern, perhaps the most grave concern after September 11, 2001. News reports
in recent years indicate that weapons grade materials are being smuggled out of
former Soviet republics. Some of these materials, or worse yet, intact weapons,
could find their way to terrorist groups who might be tempted to engage in
nuclear blackmail. They do not need missiles to deliver these weapons. All they
need is a container on one of the thousands of container ships that go into
ports across the U.S.
Even if it is a crude weapon, the destruction from a small nuclear blast in
Boston or New York or Baltimore or San Francisco or Charleston or Savannah or
Jacksonville or any number of other ports would make the twin towers atrocity
look small.
Nations like Pakistan,
which have nuclear capabilities and have in fact tested nuclear weapons, are of
particular concern. Islamic Pakistan
has had a long-term conflict with primarily Hindu India ever since the Pakistan was created when India was partitioned following its independence
from Great Britain
in 1947. The government of Pakistan
has been much less stable than that of India. It has to deal with many of
its own Islamic extremists who would impose a religious state if they gained
power. This gives the U.S.
two reasons to help foster a stable government in Pakistan. First, cooperation is
needed in dealing with the extremists that move in and out of Afghanistan from the mountains in Pakistan, which has a long common border with Afghanistan.
Second, the nuclear capability of Pakistan makes it important in its
own right.
The U.S. must also worry
about our relationship with Russia.
Economic distress led to a transformation of a fragile democratic republic into
an authoritarian state led by former head of the KGB, Vladimir Putin. Using oil revenues to fund economic prosperity, Russia is
starting to send signals that it might start attempting to rebuild its empire. Russia has
reacted quite negatively to our efforts to extend membership into our NATO
alliance to some former Soviet satellite nations. As tension grows, agreements
to limit the building of nuclear weapons might begin to crumble. A few years
ago, one extreme nationalist politician, Vladimir Zhirnovsky, advocated
rebuilding the Soviet empire by force. If the Balkan nations resisted, he
wanted to use large fans to blow nuclear radiation over them. In short, it is
in our national interest to stabilize the Russian economy and give them a stake
in maintaining the peace.
A new emerging area of concern is not our security on land, air, sea, or even
outer-space. Rather it is a new kind of space, cyber space. Consider how much
damage could be done to our economy if economic records and transactions were
compromised or destroyed. Commerce and business would come to a standstill. The
US is just starting to gear up with "cyber-security" for business and
state a local governments, as well as of course for the military, whose computer
systems have been under attack for some time now. Protecting computer systems
and information is critical to the well being of any nation today. Recently
outsiders were able to hack into our military drone program and see what the
controllers of these drones were seeing as these drones flew over potential
targets.
Considering these new realities, in building our defense, how much is enough today? The answer
must go well beyond nuclear weapons, but let us consider the nuclear part of
the answer first. Total nuclear disarmament is still out of the question from
the point of view of most who study these questions. The U.S. probably
needs to maintain somewhere in the range of 500 warheads that can be delivered
to any nation in the world that would create a threat with their own nuclear
weapons. We will not be entirely free of MAD for some time to come.
Movement to that level of roughly 500 must take place gradually. The U.S. must see how the republics of the former USSR, most especially Russia, reduce their weapons and
build stable economies and governments.
The U.S.
must do all that it can afford to do to help this process along. Former
President Nixon faulted the first President Bush for not doing more to help
stabilize the Soviet economy. The U.S. must do all it can to
encourage wealthy allies to help the new republics. Helping is certainly in
their interest. America's
economy cannot afford to foot the bill if another arms race takes place. Indeed,
the U.S. could not have even
afforded the Gulf War had it not been for the financial help from Saudi Arabia and Japan. The Iraq and Afghan
wars have been a major drain on our economy since 2001.
During the 2000 presidential campaign, candidate Bush vowed that under
his administration the U.S.
military would not become involved in “nation building.” It was a popular
rhetorical line in a nation that still harbored isolationist tendencies. Most
Americans feel that we spend far too much money on foreign aid. Typically most
incoming American government students think that we spend more on foreign aid
than on Social Security. They are wrong by a factor of more than ten! Yet Bush
did not withdraw troops from duties in Kosovo and engaged in nation-building in
Afghanistan
following the fall of the Taliban, even though that is not the term that the
White House used (“a rose by any other name …”). Afghanistan was put on the back-burner and mostly ignored after we invaded Iraq
in 2003. By the time President Obama had come into office, the situation in
Afghanistan was dire. President Obama renewed the commitment, at least for
a limited time, after a painful review of options. He sent in a surge of troops
pushing the number up over 100,000. Will that be enough? How long will they have
to stay? We do not really know. As of this writing in 2010, things are
again not going as well as hoped. No outside power
in history has been able to transform or hold Afghanistan—including the Russians,
the British or even all the way back to Alexander the Great. Are we guilty of
hubris to think that we can?
After the fall of Saddam's government in Iraq,
which we essentially did alone, we had another long-term commitment in nation-building.
While we have been able to withdraw our combat troops, we still have tens of
thousands of non-combat personnel there. Moreover, the ability of the political
leaders in Iraq to work out their differences and form a stable government and
minimize acts of terrorism by the various competing groups is far from certain.
Our success may be measured in an ironic way: when the government feels strong
enough to ask us or demand that we leave.
The U.S.
must do all that it can to control and limit nuclear proliferation. This
includes agreements, cooperation among police and intelligence agencies, and
helping defuse conflicts that lead other nations to feel they need weapons. The
U.S.
has no choice but to play a leading diplomatic role in the world. We are in
effect blackmailed into this role by the existence of weapons technology we
helped create. And the world certainly looks to the U.S. for leadership. While the infamous
videotaped Clinton
testimony before Special Prosecutor Ken Starr’s grand jury was being shown on
tv in early 1999, the President was receiving an unusual and warm standing
ovation at the U.N. from leaders from all over the world. The message was not that
the world community approved of his personal immoral behavior, but that he had
their support in leading the strongest nation in the world to play a leading
role in world affairs and that they considered these world affairs to be much
more important. That is why the Senate's
refusal to ratify Clinton’s
test ban treaty was so important in late 1999. President Bush had no new
initiatives here. But after President Obama negotiated and signed a new treaty
aimed at further reducing nuclear weapons, the Senate has as of this writing
refused to ratify it.
Ironically, this new situation created a better justification for a
limited Strategic Defense Initiative system (sometimes called “Star Wars”) than
ever before. While it only destabilized things in a nuclear arms race with
another superpower, it made some sense if it could deflect a few weapons of a
small power, whether they be launched by intent or by accident. Unfortunately,
a fully operational SDI system would be of little use against low altitude
Cruise type missile delivered weapons or against terrorists who would likely
smuggle a weapon to its target, for example, aboard a tramp steamer. However,
given the high cost of such a limited system and its doubtful usefulness along
with the severe pressures that exist on the federal budget, SDI remains an idea
whose time may not yet have come. Despite this, the George W. Bush
administration pressed ahead with efforts to build the system in 2001. Whether
the post 11 September reality of vulnerability to low tech weapons will change
this plan is too early to tell at this writing. However, though the Bush
administration continued to pursue building a limited SDI system, the Obama
administration may choose another direction.
While the U.S.
probably no longer needs or can afford huge military outposts to contain
another superpower, the nation does need a modern conventional army that can
protect vital interests elsewhere. While the causes of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait
in 1990 can be debated, most would agree that the U.S. needs the capacity to stop
such actions with forces that can be rapidly deployed if necessary. It is these
forces that are most useful in going after small groups of terrorists hiding in
third world nations. Rapid deployment forces could also be used to help quickly
with natural disasters here and abroad. But to be successful in the long run,
we need the help of other nations in these actions. We do not have unlimited
wealth. I would argue that probably the most important way to combat
terrorism in the Middle East has nothing to do with the military-- it has to do
with rebuilding our energy sector so that oil is not our greatest source of
energy. Even if you do not believe in global climate change, you should consider
that some of the money you pay for every gallon of gas goes to fund the
activities of people who hate us. And some of that goes to buy weapons that kill
our sons and daughters who are fighting these radical people.
IV. When To Use Force
When to use these conventional forces is the other great vexing question
for U.S.
foreign policy. Since the Vietnam
fiasco, the U.S.
has deployed conventional forces in a number of places, some quite successfully
and some disastrously. (As I noted a number of years ago, it seems that every
time I edit this chapter I must add another military intervention to the
list—it is now a very long list that only goes back about three decades!)
- President Carter attempted to deploy a small number of
troops in a rescue mission of the U.S.
hostages held in Iran
in 1980. The mission ended at their rendezvous point in the desert where a
helicopter crashed into the transport costing American lives and possibly
costing Carter the next election to Ronald Reagan.
- President Reagan sent marines to help keep the peace in
Lebanon
and before they knew it they were in the middle of a shooting war. We left
after 241 were killed by a truck bomb that collapsed the hotel in which
they were sleeping. Reagan was lucky that he had some time to recover politically
before the next election.
- Later he sent troops in a successful mission to
overturn the pro-Cuban communist government in Grenada.
- President Bush sent troops into Panama to
"arrest" President Noriega for his activities in drug smuggling.
The real interest of the U.S.
here was the security of the Panama Canal, a vital commercial link between
the two major oceans that border the east and west coasts of the U.S.
- Of course, Bush also sent troops to the Middle East in Operation Desert Shield and Desert
Storm – the Gulf War. These operations against Iraq
were quite successful in driving Iraq
from Kuwait, where
access to oil (in both Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia)
was the vital interest. However, Bush stopped the war before Saddam
Hussein was toppled. He endangered both those within his nation (the
Kurds--whom he killed at almost any opportunity) and those without.
American troops remained in the area enforcing a “no-fly zone” until the
2003 invasion.
- Bush's going-away present to President-elect Bill
Clinton in 1992 was a troop commitment in Somalia—an action we took all
by ourselves. The mission was humanitarian--end starvation that was the
result of clan warfare taking place all over the nation. We did succeed in
at least temporarily ending the starvation, but we were unwilling to pay
the cost of disarming the clans completely. The clan leaders hid their
weapons and waited while giving minimal cooperation. As a few American
troops died, the nation lost patience and pulled out. Once again, the
clans are back in control. The area has been sliding back into chaos and
is now the center of pirate activity off the coast.
- In September of 1994 President Clinton made his own
troop commitment, this time much closer to home. American troops went into
Haiti
after we negotiated (with a great deal of help from former President
Carter) the withdrawal of the military general who were ruling the island
nation. Once in place, the Americans--unlike in Somalia--disarmed the Haitian
military and police. The democratically elected President Aristede, who
was driven from the country after his election by the generals, regained
his office. The nation is now struggling to meet the revolution of rising
expectations (remember this idea?). Most American troops were withdrawn.
By the end of the year 2000, only a few dozen troops were in Haiti.
- In late summer of 1998, President Clinton sent unmanned
weapons (Cruise missiles) to bomb alleged terrorist camps and chemical
weapons facilities in Afghanistan
and Sudan
that were thought to be associated with terrorist Osama bin Laden. This
was in retaliation for the bombing of embassies in Africa.
- In 1999 the US and NATO allies intervened in Kosovo in
the name of humanitarianism as Yugoslavian led Serbs tried to “ethnically
cleanse” that region of their nation of ethnic Albanians, who comprised
80% of the population. After nearly 80 days of bombing, the Serbs agreed
to withdraw. Eventually the new Yugoslavian government turned over former
President Milosovic to the U.N. to be tried for war crimes.
- Then came Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the U.S. has been pursuing
terrorists led by Osama bin Laden since the 11 September attacks. Having
driven bin Laden underground and scattered his forces and the supporting
Taliban forces, which have been fighting an escalating guerilla war in
recent years against us and our NATO allies and the new government that
has little control outside the cities, where only about 20% of the
population lives.
- In Iraq were we overthrew Saddam Hussein in 2003 and
have been trying to foster a stable government that is not endangered by a
civil war between the religious and ethnic groups there (Shia, Sunni, and
Kurd, to name the largest three.)
- President Obama sent
about 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan in 2009-10 to try and reverse
the tide, boosting the numbers to over 100,000. The reduction in Iraq made
Afghanistan our largest commitment in combat. By the last few months of the
year of 2010, we were suffering about 1-2 KIA a day with a total over 1,000
for that effort, most of which took place in 2009-2010.
A. Theoretical Guidelines
With this short history in mind, what rules should we use in deciding
where to send American troops to risk their lives? President Reagan's Secretary
of Defense, Casper Weinberger, laid
out several principles that might be used as guidelines in making this kind of
decision. 1) A vital national interest must be at stake. 2) The
President must have public and congressional support. 3) The mission
must have objectives that are achievable through military means
(presumably, defeating and disarming are ok but complex social overhauls and
"nation-building" are not military capabilities). 4) When you do go
in, go in with overwhelming force--avoid gradual escalations that create
sunk costs which then justify further commitments. 5) You must have a clear
exit strategy, that is, a clear observable point at which you say you have
achieved your goal and can leave without loss of lives or face.
Other experts have added a few other guidelines we might consider. Have
a clear chain of command so that those on the ground know who is calling
the shots and so that mid-level commanders do not go too far or hold back when
they should not. Never underestimate your opponent. They may not look
like an army, but weapons can kill you even when fired by people not wearing
uniforms. Others advise us to avoid getting involved in civil wars where one
cannot help taking sides and then becoming the target of the other side. This
was the danger in sending peace keeping troops into Bosnia, where we have been seen by
the Serbs as taking the side of the Bosnians. And it is the great danger in Iraq, where at
least three major ethnic groups have long battled for supremacy. In Afghanistan,
the religiously fanatic Taliban arose following years of civil war after the
Soviet withdrawal in the late 1980s. Afgans supported the Taliban because it
seemed able to bring about peace, if not prosperity, to the nation. Afghanistan is
more a collection of warring tribes and clans than a nation with a single
identity.
B. In Practice
While these ideas sound reasonable in theory, they are difficult to
use in practice because they are subject to interpretation as they are
applied to concrete situations. For example, deciding what is in our vital
interest is not an easy matter except in obvious situations. Haitian refugees
flooding ashore in Florida
is certainly a national interest--we must keep our borders secure and enforce
orderly immigration. But is this a VITAL interest? Can humanitarian concerns be
part of the national interest? Is preserving order in the world a national
interest for a nation that has the world as its market? Is preserving our role
as a leader in NATO a vital national interest? (This is one justification Clinton used for proposals to send peace-keeping troops to
Bosnia.)
While public and Congressional support is certainly desirable, what if time is
too short to obtain this support? The War Powers Act of 1973 recognized the
President's power to act in an emergency, though it requires congressional
consultation if time permits and requires congressional approval if the troops
stay very long.
The criterion of being achievable through military means is not
at all clear because the military has many capabilities, including running the
civil affairs of a nation, as it has in many instances. How is this different
from the initial stages of nation building?
Exit strategies (that means how to
get out) may seem clear when you go in. But they may not work out when allies
renege on commitments (like they did in 1998 in forcing Saddam Hussein to allow
inspections) or when things do not go as planned.
Finally almost all areas in
which we have involved ourselves entail some kind of civil strife or conflict.
So this can't always be used as an excuse to stay out.
The bottom line is that we will have to proceed on a case-by-case basis.
The answer will rarely be clear. (Remember no perfect answers?) Presidents will decide and we will praise them
when things work out well (Grenada,
Panama, and the Gulf War)
and second-guess them when things go badly (Vietnam,
Lebanon, Somalia). On
which side of the list will Iraq
and Afghanistan
be? Voters will ultimately hold presidents accountable if the disaster was too
big and too recent.
However, this does not mean that we should not debate and
discuss. That is a part of being an open democratic republic. The guidelines may not
always provide precise answers, but they at least force us to consider many of
the important questions and to consider how an intervention will be the same or
different than previous ones. Systematic analytical thinking--even if
difficult--is a better way to develop foreign policy than proceeding on emotion
and instinct.
The last element in the answer to “how much is enough” was well captured
in Ross Perot's quip: we can't be a military superpower unless we are an
economic superpower. Indeed, the less the nation spends on defense, the
better. That money is better spent on education and basic research and the
infrastructure. Energy independence is another part of the equation. The less
the U.S.
is dependent on foreign energy supplies, the less likely the nation is to have
to stop a dictator who tries to engage in energy blackmail.
V. Looking to
the Future
Rapid changes in the world have created exciting new possibilities and
have posed new challenges for the United States. Clearly, the
question of "how much is enough" today includes dramatically fewer
nuclear weapons along with dramatically more emphasis on international
negotiation, cooperation in helping stabilize other nations of the world, security measures against terrorism, including
cyber terrorism, and
vigilance as the situation evolves.
Events in recent years seem to indicate some positive trends and some
negative trends. Russia
found help in financing its space program from Germany, which is sending up their own
astronauts in Russian space craft. But their economy is so bad that NASA sought
money to pay Russian workers to build their part of the space station program.
Yeltsin's October 1994 visit to the U.S.
was centered around requests for more trade, not aid--a welcome request from
the U.S.
point of view. But the economic reforms were done badly--too much state owned
industry were given to former communist leaders who did not know how to run it.
Why? Yeltsin was buying their political support. By 1998 the Russians needed
massive loans to hold up their currency. Having opposed the mass killing of
civilians in Bosnia
and then Kosovo, the allies did little as Russians bombed civilians in
breakaway provinces within their own borders. The new leader of Russia, President
Putin, the former head of the KGB, took hard line approaches to internal
Russian security. But he is cooperating with NATO and the UN in fighting
terrorism and gave the U.S.
military permission to use Russian land as bases of operation against terrorists
in Afghanistan. The NAFTA
(North American Free Trade Agreement) treaty gives the U.S. more leverage over Mexico on environmental matters and probably
will reduce the influx of illegal immigrants into the U.S. And the GATT (General Agreement of Trade and
Tariffs) was approved by the U.S. Congress after some delay. This will increase
trading relationships among nations, making military conflicts less likely. The
WTO (World Trade Organizaiton), which followed GATT, has attempted to
further open the world economy, but it has met stiff resistance from a wide
range of protestors wherever it meets. NATO finally forced the Serbs to come to
the peace table and Milosevic is on trial for war crimes. Progress has been
made in the Balkans. People are much more free to travel now that they have one
set of license plates so that your ethnicity is not advertised on your car. But
resettlement back into home areas by people driven out through ethnic cleansing
has not gone well. And ethnic outbreaks continue to take place. The PLO along
with the more militant Hamas and the Israelis seemed to be locked in an endless
dance of death and destruction. Israel
reacts harshly to each terrorist attack and seems to have been successful only
in creating more would-be suicide bombers. The Israelis continue to build
settlements in land that the Palestinians consider to be theirs. We cannot
broker and lead any further agreements while we are engaged in wars in nearby
lands, even though after the terrorism of 11 September, the U.S. has even
more incentive to try and broker a peace to remove one ongoing source of
conflict that fuels extremism. Iraq seems more stable and independent in 2010
than it did in 2008--they finally seem to be forming a government based on some
compromise, an idea with which they seem not very familiar. At least the conflict in northern Ireland seems to have
subsided at the moment. We have reached an agreement with North Korea on North
Korean nuclear reactors that could have created materials for additional
nuclear weapons beyond the few crude ones they have tested (though this deal
has been an on and off again thing over several years). Finally, although the
attacks of 9-11 indicate that we are far from secure, the response from
nations around the world in the Afghanistan phase of our response was
encouraging to those who value “ordini” and encouraging in the sense that we
had the support of the world. But our extension of this war to Iraq undercut
much, if not most of that support. That weakened the support we once had in Afghanistan, so every year we are more alone in
that effort.
All these things are connected!
Machiavelli warned us that “ordini” rarely lasts for long. Whatever
agreements and coalitions that we are able to build out of the blood and
suffering will be at best short term. But that is the nature of politics. Each
generation must do its best to step forward again after the inevitable setbacks
– yes, that is a normative statement.
Two final comments. Given the interdependency of all national economies,
one cannot make as clean a distinction between domestic and foreign policy as
one could in the relatively more simple days of super-power competition. At
least then we knew who the enemy was. Judging from the litany of events in the
preceding paragraphs, we seem to have a new enemy every few months, and each
presents new challenges. We will continue to struggle over the question of how
much is enough.
Finally, it may be that military power—what political scientists often
call hard power— is less important
than economic power—what political scientists call soft power. Maybe blue jeans and Coca Cola and computers and rock
and roll and jazz and basketball and even football are more powerful in
transforming nations than all our military might. The fanatics may be able to
fight low level wars of insurgency for decades against our military—in these
situations time is on their side. Americans usually are not willing to send
their sons and daughters into conflicts when no clear end is in sight. But time
is on our side when they are fighting against western culture and all its many
attractions. They can slow down the invasion of rock and roll, but young people
will eventually seek it out and embrace it and the individualistic consumer
values that go along with it will eventually win out—not at a cost to us, but
at a profit!
KEY TERMS AND
IDEAS
the fundamental question of defense
policy
massive retaliation
flexible response
counter-insurgency
Cuban missile crisis
first strike capability
MIRV's
SLBM's
SDI
MAD
Bush Doctrine
Multilateral approach
Robert McNamara
nuclear proliferation
nuclear club
Vladimir Putin
recent presidential commitments of
U.S.
troops
cyber security
Casper Weinberger and rules for
military intervention
why the rules are difficult to apply
NAFTA
GATT
WTO
Hard and soft power